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ABSTRACT

Existing explanations of lawyer licensing focusing on the need to ensure
lawyer quality are unconvincing. A license to practice is a dubious signal of
quality, the licensing requirement restricts the availability of legal services, and
state licensing is subject to political capture by lawyers. These criticisms of
lawyer licensing laws are increasingly important as the current system is
threatened by changes in the legal services market and increased federal
regulation of the legal profession. It is, therefore, time to reexamine the theory
underlying the state licensing system.
This Article provides an alternative rationale for state licensing
requirements. Lawyer licensing encourages lawyers to participate in lawmaking
by capitalizing the benefits of their law-improvement efforts in the value of the
law license. In other words, the license gives lawyers a kind of property right in
state law. State competition gives lawyers an incentive to favor welfaremaximizing state laws that make the state attractive as a location for businesses
and as a forum for litigation. This theory has important implications for both
federalism and the scope and nature of lawyer licensing requirements.
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INTRODUCTION

Many commentators believe that state licensing of lawyers, like professional
licensing generally, accomplishes little other than keeping the price of legal
services and lawyers' wages high by restricting entry into the profession.' These
doubts about lawyer licensing are especially acute in light of rapid changes in the
legal services market. The increasingly interstate nature of legal services, the
growth of nationwide professional firms, and the provision of legal information
over the Internet call into question traditional rules requiring a state license for
the practice of law.
Powerful forces are moving for changes in the traditional approach to
lawyer licensing. Among other recent events, several states and the American
Bar Association have endorsed clarifying rules on multi-jurisdictional practice;'
the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission have challenged state
bar restrictions on unauthorized practice of law;3 and Congress has enacted a
provision for a federal code of ethics for securities lawyers, a significant step
toward federalization of law practice. 4 This is, therefore, a good time to consider
the fundamental issues regarding the current system of regulating lawyers,
particularly including what types of activities should require a law license and
whether lawyer regulation should continue to be based on licensing by individual
states.
This Article presents a new rationale for state licensing of
lawyers-specifically, that state licensing gives lawyers an incentive to
participate in the lawmaking process. Lawyers contribute much valuable time
to state law reform not merely to enhance their own reputations, but to attract
litigation or clients to their states. State licensing, operating in conjunction with

1. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, OccupationalLicensure, in CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM 137 (1962); Morris M. Kleiner, OccupationalLicensing, 14 J. ECON. PERSP.
189 (2000); Simon Rottenberg, Introduction, in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND
REGULATION 1(Simon Rottenberg ed., 1980); George J. Stigler, The Theory ofEconomic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
2. State positions are summarized at http://www.crossingthebar.com (last modified
Mar. 15, 2004). The ABA has recommended amending Model Rule 5.5 to specifically
permit practice other than in a state in which a lawyer is licensed in certain
See American Bar Association, Report of the Commission on
circumstances.
MultijurisdictionalPractice(Aug. 2002), availableat http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjphome.html [hereinafter, MJP Commission].
3. See infra note 129.
4. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. 2003).
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conflict of laws rules, plays a role in this process by protecting lawyers'
lawmaking efforts from free-riding by those who are not licensed locally. A state
law license confers an exclusive right to represent clients based in the state and
to practice in the state's courts. Moreover, the law applicable to a case or
transaction often depends on the forum and where parties reside. Parties
therefore will choose to reside or litigate in a state based to some extent on the
quality of the state's law.5 It follows that the value of a licensed lawyer's special
rights to represent clients residing in a state or to appear in a state's court will
depend on the licensing state's law. This encourages lawyers to participate in
making that law.
This analysis has two important implications. First, the analysis is
significant to the debate over the efficiency of federalism and state competition.
A federal system makes it easy for individuals and firms to choose laws that suit
their needs. It is not clear, however, why state lawmakers should have an
incentive to provide suitable laws. Corporate franchise fees can give lawmakers
in a small state like Delaware significant incentives to encourage local
incorporations." But prior literature has not clarified states' incentives to
compete outside of this narrow context. This Article shows that lawyers'
participation in state lawmaking in order to attract clients is the engine that drives
jurisdictional competition It also shows that, by encouraging lawyers to engage
in these activities, lawyer licensing is the fuel that runs the engine. Indeed,

5. See F.H. Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars,
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 561; Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Contract and
JurisdictionalFreedom, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 325 (F.H.

Buckley ed., 1999) [hereinafter Kobayashi & Ribstein, Contract];Erin Ann O'Hara &
Larry E. Ribstein, Conflict ofLaws andChoice ofLaw, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND

ECONOMICS 631 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000); Erin A. O'Hara
& Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
1151 (2000) [hereinafter O'Hara & Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency]; Larry E.
Ribstein, Choosing Law By Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245 (1993) [hereinafter Ribstein,
Choosing];Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politicsin ContractualChoiceofLaw,
37 GA. L. REV. 363 (2003) [hereinafter Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics];Larry E.
Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, State Regulation ofElectronic Commerce, 51 EMORY
L.J. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Ribstein & Kobayashi, State Regulation].
6. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation
Puzzle, I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985) [hereinafter Romano, Law as a Product];see
also Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in CorporateLaw, 8 CARDOZO L.
REV. 709 (1987) (arguing that reincorporation costs limit state competition, so that firms
reincorporate mainly when they are contemplating a transaction that is facilitated in the
new jurisdiction).
7. For an earlier article noting this point, focusing on state choice of law statutes,
see Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware,Lawyers, and ContractualChoice of Law, 19 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 999 (1994).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/1
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states' ability to encourage lawyer participation in lawmaking by licensing
lawyers helps support a federal rather than a unified system of laws.
Second, this Article's analysis has implications for the nature and scope of
lawyer licensing. The lawmaking-incentive argument provides better support
than traditional arguments for requiring broad training and education of lawyers.
But it does so only where lawyers' participation in lawmaking is likely to lead
to more efficient laws. This may be the case only as to types of practice where
state laws are subject to viable competition that can weed out laws that unduly
favor lawyers' interests.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I evaluates the traditional argument
for lawyer licensing based on ensuring lawyer quality. Part II presents this
Article's altemative justification based on lawyers' participation in state
lawmaking. Parts III and IV discuss the implications of this theory for,
respectively, state competition and the extent and scope of licensing
requirements. Part V concludes, highlighting the potential limitations of this
Article's analysis.
I. THE TRADITIONAL CASE FOR STATE LICENSING

This Article focuses on the system whereby lawyers are licensed to practice
law in particular states.8 Under the current system, one who does not have a
license may not practice law. The need for a license restricts entry into the legal
profession and mobility among the states by, among other things, requiring an
extensive legal education; requiring lawyers to incur the costs and risks of the
bar examination in each state where they wish to practice (depending on
reciprocity rules); and imposing costs of maintaining the license, such as
mandatory continuing legal education ("CLE").
It is important to emphasize that licensing is required not only for those who
call themselves "lawyers," as would be the case for a less binding certification
requirement,9 but, by virtue of unauthorized practice rules, for anyone who wants
to perform legal services. Unauthorized practice laws and the definition of law

8. Inmost states, supreme courts control the rules for bar admission. See Benjamin
Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of the
JustificationsforEntry andConductRegulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429,434 n. 16 (2001).
Courts and legislatures often delegate lawyer regulation to the state bar association. For
analyses of compulsory bar membership, also referred to as "integrated" or "unified"
bars, see Theodore J. Schneyer, The Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept:
Generalizingfrom the Wisconsin Case, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 1, and Bradley A.
Smith, The Limits of Compulsory Professionalism: How the Unified Bar Harms the
Legal Profession, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 35 (1994). Part I.D discusses possible
alternative systems of regulating lawyers.
9. See infra Part I.D. 1.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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practice are discussed in more detail below.' For present purposes it is enough
to note that a non-lawyer not only may not participate in legal proceedings on
behalf of another, but also may not be able to advise others on the law. Given
the pervasiveness of legal issues in modem life, this prohibition applies to a
potentially wide range of conduct.
Another important feature of the current system is that lawyers who practice
outside the state where they are licensed risk fines in both the licensing and nonlicensing states." Careful lawyers must particularly beware the borderline
cases, such as where the lawyer must spend a substantial amount of time on
behalf of a single client in a non-licensing state.' 2 While lawyers can be licensed
in several states, this involves potentially high costs of taking a bar exam or
being admitted on motion in each state, as well as maintaining bar memberships
through continuing legal education, dues, pro bono work and the like."
This Part discusses the traditional case for state licensing of professionals,
including lawyers. It shows that conventional arguments emphasizing
information asymmetries are too weak to support the current system. This
suggests that this Article's alternative theory that state licensing gives lawyers
incentives to participate in lawmaking may provide critical support for retaining
some form of state licensing. Subparts A and B discuss the questionable benefits
and significant costs of state licensing. Subpart C provides a political
perspective that casts further doubt on the traditional arguments for state
licensing by showing how licensing promotes lawyers' interests. Subpart D
shows how licensing's benefits can be obtained through alternative, arguably less
costly, means. Subpart E discusses the market and political attacks on the
current system that make it vulnerable in the absence of a new and stronger
rationale such as the one this Article proposes.
A. The InformationAsymmetry Argument
Arguments for mandatory licensing of lawyers often are based on
information asymmetry between lawyers and clients. A client can most reliably
judge a lawyer based on experience with the lawyer and the results the lawyer
produces. Legal services therefore are a kind of "credence" good that the client

10. See infra Part IV.

11. For discussions of the penalties for unlicensed practice focusing on the specific
context of multi-state law practice, see William T. Barker, ExtrajurisdictionalPractice
by Lawyers, 56 Bus. LAW. 1501 (2001), Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Jurisdiction,Choice of
Law, and the Multistate Attorney, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 799 (1995), and Charles W.
Wolfram, Sneaking Around in the Legal Profession: InterjurisdictionalUnauthorized
Practiceby TransactionalLawyers, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 665 (1995).
12. See supra note 11.
13. For discussion of licensing requirements, see infra Part IV.A.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/1
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initially takes on trust. 4 Clients' difficulties in evaluating lawyers arguably
make an unregulated lawyer market one for "lemons" in which low-quality
lawyers ultimately will predominate."5
This argument is based on consumers' high costs of acquiring information
about the quality of professional services.' 6 The argument therefore assumes that
government can provide information through licensing at a lower cost than
individual consumers would incur through self-help. 7 A lawyer's license tells
clients that the lawyer meets certain minimum qualifications. This information
may be particularly helpful for clients who deal rarely with the legal system, lack
independent resources for checking qualifications, or have relatively small or
routine matters that do not justify substantial investigation.
Licensing laws not only provide a screening mechanism, but also back rules
governing professional conduct. Legal representation can give rise to agency
costs-that is, the costs of a property owner's delegating management power to
a non-owner agent whose interests may conflict with the principal's. 8 For
example, a lawyer may spend insufficient time on a client's work, misuse client
funds, spend more time than necessary on a client's work, or misrepresent her
qualifications.' 9 The state's power to withdraw a professional license enforces

14. As to credence goods generally, see Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free
Competition andthe OptimalAmount ofFraud,16 J.L. & ECON. 67,69 (1973), and Ellen

R. Jordan & Paul H. Rubin, An Economic Analysis ofthe Law of FalseAdvertising, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 527, 530-31 (1979).
15. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality
Uncertainty andthe Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). For applications to
professionals, see Hayne E. Leland, Minimum-Quality Standards and Licensing in
Markets with Asymmetric Information, in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE, supra note 1, at
265, Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory ofMinimum Quality
Standards, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1328 (1979), Thomas G. Moore, The PurposeofLicensing,
4 J.L & ECON. 93, 104-05 (1961), and Carl Shapiro, Investment, Moral Hazard, and
OccupationalLicensing, 53 REV. ECON. STUD. 843 (1986). For an article examining
market solutions to the credence good problem, see Thomas N. Hubbard, How Do
ConsumersMotivate Experts? ReputationalIncentives in an Auto RepairMarket, 45 J.L.
& ECON. 437 (2002).

16. See generally George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL.
ECoN. 213 (1961).
17. For commentary making the information cost argument in the context of
professional licensing, see CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST
35-42 (1977), and Keith B. Leffler, PhysicianLicensure: Competition and Monopoly in
American Medicine, 21 J.L. & ECON. 165, 172-74 (1978).

18. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory ofthe Firm:
ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976).

19. See Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure,
84 VA. L. REV. 1707 (1998).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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conduct regulation by causing forfeiture of the professional's substantial
investment in the training and other costs necessary to obtain the license.2"
These arguments require two important qualifications. First, private
markets or alternative methods of protecting consumers, including malpractice
liability and certification,2" may produce comparable benefits at the same or
lower cost. Clients have low-cost methods of obtaining reliable information
about lawyers without any regulation, including reputation information from
friends and their own past dealings with lawyers.22 Lawyers can address the
information problem by signaling quality through advertising and other ways.23
Second, regulation must be appropriately designed to provide quality
assurances. Some barriers to entry are less effective than others in ameliorating
information asymmetry regarding professional services.24 Poorly designed
licensing laws may injure consumers by providing a false assurance of quality.2
Even apart from these qualifications, the benefit to clients is unclear.
Clients are unlikely to assume without any information that a lawyer will be
completely honest and trustworthy. Indeed, the "lemons" theory assumes that
buyers understand the quality problem and therefore pay less for both high and
low-quality products than they would if there were no such problem to
compensate for the risk of being cheated or for the cost of self-protecting by
monitoring, obtaining a bond, or getting more information.
Under the traditional information-asymmetry rationale, lawyer licensing
arguably has four types of benefits. First, by providing quality assurances,

20. See Alan D. Wolfson et al., Regulating the Professions: A Theoretical
LICENSURE, supra note 1, at 206.
21. See infra Part I.D.
22. See Barton, supra note 8, at 439; George C. Leef, The Casefor a FreeMarket
in Legal Services, CATO POL'Y ANALYSIS, Oct. 9, 1998, at 1; Keith B. Leffler,
Commentary, in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE, supra note 1, at 290.
23. See Fred. S. McChesney & Timothy I. Muris, The Effect ofAdvertising on the
Quality of Legal Services, 65 A.B.A. J. 1503 (1979) (showing that legal clinic using
advertising in high-volume legal practice reduced costs without compromising quality);
Timothy J. Muris & Fred S. McChesney, Advertising and the Priceand QualityofLegal
Services: The Casefor Legal Clinics, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 179 (same). For
general theoretical discussions of the role of advertising in providing quality assurances,
see Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring
ContractualPerformance,89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (198 1), Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical
Integration,AppropriableRents, and the Competitive ContractingProcess, 21 J.L. &
ECON. 297 (1978), and Leffler, supra note 22. Indeed, a practitioner's incurring the
opportunity costs of choosing to make a living out of law itself signals that at least the
lawyer genuinely believes in her ability.
24. See infra Part I.B. 1. But note that any entry barrier arguably provides at least
some information, if only in permitting the professional to signal her confidence that she
has enough skill to warrant the opportunity cost of obtaining the license.
25. See infra Part I.B.2.

Framework, in OCCUPATIONAL
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licensing encourages people to use licensed professional advisors rather than
other ways of dealing with the law, including self-representation. 26 The question,
then, is whether society is better off if people get their legal advice from
professional advisors. Professionalizing legal advice arguably serves social
justice, the rule of law, and the reliability of contracts." On the other hand, legal
professionals may promote socially wasteful litigation. Also, licensing, by
increasing the price of legal advice, may reduce low-income clients' access to
legal services.2" This might be ameliorated by requiring lawyers to render
services to the poor as part of the cost of the license.29 But this requirement
could have its own negative consequences, including encouraging more
inefficient litigation.3
Second, licensing may benefit lawyers by reducing their costs of signaling
quality. But this benefit accrues mainly to lawyers who practice alone or in small
firms and who have difficulty signaling quality in other ways. By contrast, large
law firms can signal quality by posting substantial and long-lived reputation
bonds.3 It is not clear how society gains by subsidizing small firms. Licensing

26. However, as discussed infra Part I.B.2, licensing may actually encourage those
people who do use substitutes to use substitutes that are inferior to those they would use
if licensing and unauthorized practice laws did not drive the superior goods from the
market.
27. See Barton, supra note 8; Frank B. Cross, The First Thing We Do, Let's Kill
All the Economists: An EmpiricalEvaluation of the Effect of Lawyers on the United
States Economy and PoliticalSystem, 70 TEX. L. REv. 645, 678-79 (1992) (arguing that
"[t]he uncertain and relatively insignificant monetary costs of lawyering are more than
justified by the nonmarketed social goods (including human rights and democracy) that
lawyers help supply"); Malcolm Getz et al., Competition at the Bar: The Correlation
Between the BarExamination PassRate and the ProfitabilityofPractice,67 VA. L. REV.
863,864 (1981) (noting importance of lawyers in ensuring access toj ustice and reliability
of contracts).
28. See infra text accompanying note 59.
29. Current rules do not include such a requirement. See Barton, supra note 8.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 6.1, recommends that "[a] lawyer should
aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year."
However, Comment 12 to the Rule states that "[t]he responsibility set forth in this Rule
is not intended to be enforced through disciplinary process." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 6.1 cmt. 12 (2003).
30. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 61 (1995). This is an old

argument. See ROBERT BURTON, THE ANATOMY OF MELANCHOLY: VOLUME ONE 84
(Holbrook Jackson ed., 1932) (noting that lawyers "plead for poor men gratis, but they
are but as a stale to catch others"). Pro bono rules also may have anti-competitive effects.
See Jonathan R. Macey, Mandatory Pro Bono: Comfortfor the Poor or Welfarefor the
Rich?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1115 (1992) (noting that pressures to do pro bono work help
large firms by reducing competition from smaller firms).
31. With respect to this function of large law firms, see Ribstein, supra note 19
(showing how ethical rules backed by mandatory licensing may discourage the growth
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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may reduce concentration in the market for legal services,32 but the cost of such
concentration is not clear.3" Also, even if licensing reduces concentration in the
market for lawyers, it may increase concentration and reduce availability of legal
services overall by blocking entry of low-end non-lawyer providers. 4
Third, lawyer licensing arguably protects third parties who would be injured
by unregulated legal advisors who enable others to break the law. But the costs
and benefits of licensing must be compared to those of liability rules. One who
hires a lawyer to harm third parties may be held liable as a principal, or the
lawyer may be held liable for aiding and abetting the client's wrong. Focusing
on lawyers' qualifications to practice would seem to be an ineffective way to
prevent lawyers from engaging in misconduct.35
Fourth, lawyer licensing might be said to increase social welfare by backing
lawyer regulation that improves the administration of justice. 6 In particular,
licensing law practice may help ensure good lawyer conduct in court by bringing
the power of license revocation to bear on violations of conduct rules." But it
is not clear whether this additional sanction is necessary to ensure compliance
with conduct rules or that licensing contributes significantly to regulating lawyer
conduct in court.3 8
Even if these arguments support licensing of lawyers, they do not
necessarily support the current system of requiring lawyers to obtain a license in
each state in which they practice, as distinguished from the alternative
approaches to licensing discussed below.39

of large firms).
32. See Wolfson et al., supra note 20, at 207.
33. Indeed, from the standpoint of the theory emphasized in this Article, the
emphasis on small firms may impose social costs by discouraging investments in efficient
lawmaking. See infra Part II.B.3.
34. See infra text accompanying note 59.
35. This is illustrated by the apparently extensive failings of licensed professionals
to protect the public from damage in connection with the Enron bankruptcy. It is not
clear that either licensing or mandatory lawyer disclosure of client dishonesty is better
than relying on private ordering, since clients have an incentive to signal that they have
nothing to hide by hiring lawyers who pledge to disclose client wrongdoing. See Richard
W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search of Optimal
Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 221 (1995).
36. See Barton, supra note 8, at 477-81.
37. See supra text accompanying note 20.
38. See Barton, supra note 8; Leef, supra note 22.
39. See infra Part I.E.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/1
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B. Costs of State Licensing
Any benefits of lawyer licensing should be balanced against its potential
costs. The following Sections show how licensing may cause several potential
types of market distortions compared to an unrestricted market for legal
services.4" A review of these costs shows that state licensing of lawyers requires
stronger justifications than those based on information asymmetry discussed in
Subpart A.
1. Licensing as a Poor Signal of Quality
Professional licensing standards are not well designed to ensure quality of
professional services 4 and there is little evidence that they have done so.42
Specifically, it has been argued that law school,43 bar exam," and continuing
legal education requirements"' provide little assurance of attorney competence.46

40. See generally Christopher Curran, Regulation of the Professions, in 3 THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 247-55 (Peter Newman ed.,
1998) (discussing market distortions caused by licensing).
41. Milton Friedman long ago pointed out the irrationality of education
requirements for professionals. See FRIEDMAN, supranote 1,at 158. For other criticisms
of professional licensing standards, see S. DAVID YOUNG, THE RULE OF EXPERTS:
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING INAMERICA (1987), Robert G. Evans, Professionalsand the

Production Function: Can Competition Policy Improve Efficiency in the Licensed
Professions?,in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE, supra note 1, at 225, and Alan D. Wolfson
et al., supranote 20, at 180.
42. See Deborah Haas-Wilson, The Effect of CommercialPracticeRestrictions:
The Case of Optometry, 29 J.L. & ECON. 165 (1986) (showing that quality of optometry

is not affected by commercial practice restrictions); Morris M. Kleiner & Robert T.
Kudrle, Does Regulation Affect Economic Outcomes? The Case of Dentistry,43 J.L. &
ECON. 547 (2000) (study showing that increased licensing restrictiveness did not improve
dental health); Kleiner, supra note 1, at 198 (summarizing studies).
43. See Leef, supra note 22.
44. See Barton, supra note 8; Daniel R. Hansen, Note, Do We Need the Bar
Examination? A CriticalEvaluation of the Justificationsfor the Bar Examination and
ProposedAlternatives,45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1191 (1995). For other criticisms of the
bar exam, see Andrea A. Curcio, A Better Bar: Why and How the Existing Bar Exam
Should Change, 81 NEB. L. REV. 363 (2002); Kristin Booth Glen, When and Where We
Enter: Rethinking Admission to the Legal Profession, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1696 (2002).
45. See Walter Gellhom, The Abuse of OccupationalLicensing,44 U. CHI. L. REV.
6(1976).
46. Analogously, a study showed that consumers' complaints against contractors
rose as contractors learned to pass the entrance exam without becoming more competent.
See Alex R. Maurizi, The Impact of Regulation on Quality: The Case of California
Contractors,in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE, supra note 1, at 26.
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Even if licensing requirements screen out less skilled practitioners, they may
not measure the skills that matter to most clients. Many routine tasks such as
preparing wills for small estates and handling no-fault divorces call for attention
to detail rather than an understanding of the complex legal theories law schools
teach or mastery of the legal rules bar exams measure. Thus, a study found little
evidence of risk to the public from lay providers of real estate settlement
services.47

These criticisms have two important implications. First, if licensing
requirements do not exclude unfit practitioners, it follows that the costs involved
in distorting the supply of legal services discussed below outweigh the benefits
of such distortions. Second, irrational licensing requirements may mislead
clients about lawyers' competence. If, as mandatory licensing laws assume,
clients mistakenly rely on a professional's shingle, bolstering the shingle with a
license based on the wrong criteria encourages even more mistaken reliance.4
2. Distorting the Supply of Legal Services
Lawyer licensing restricts the total supply of lawyers or the supply in
particular locations or market segments. State licensing laws that prevent
lawyers from practicing outside the licensing state or discourage them from
obtaining licenses in multiple states insulate each state sub-market from
competition.49 The price of legal services may rise in a jurisdiction when
demand for lawyers increases relative to supply because licensing restricts entry
of new lawyers.5" Though lawyer supply ultimately may increase with the

47.
See Joyce Palomar, The War Between Attorneys and Lay
Conveyancers-EmpiricalEvidence Says "CeaseFire!", 31 CONN. L. REv. 423 (1999).
48. See Barton, supra note 8, at 445 (noting that bar examinations and continuing
legal education requirements send false signals of lawyer competence). For similar
criticisms of professional licensing outside of law, see generally YOUNG, supranote 41,
and Curran, supra note 40, at 250.
49. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 116-17 (1989).
50. With respect to the effect of professional licensing on mobility, see Bryan L.
Boulier, An EmpiricalExaminationofthe Influence ofLicensure and Licensure Reform
on the GeographicalDistributionofDentists, in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE, supra note
1, at 73 (showing how permitting reciprocity of licensing affects distribution of
professionals and consumer surplus among states); and Kleiner, supranote I (showing
that less reciprocity is correlated with less mobility of professionals and misallocation of
labor across states).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/1
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demand for lawyers, other things equal,"' licensing laws may cause at least shortterm market disequilibrium. 2
Important variations on bar requirements include admission on motion
without having to meet other qualifications; maintaining a local office; a written
exam that may or may not differ from that required for new lawyers; 3 a
minimum period of practice in another state; 4 reciprocity, or whether the
applicant's state admits lawyers from the entry state on similar terms; special
rules for "emeritus" lawyers or lawyers who will serve the poor; and special rules
for in-house lawyers." Bar requirements also may make it costly for lawyers to
maintain multiple bar memberships after they are admitted. For example,
lawyers in the dozen or so states that do not have a mandatory continuing legal
education requirement must incur additional costs in order to maintain bar
membership in another state that does require CLE.
It is not clear whether or how much professional licensing affects the price
or availability of professional services.5 6 Lueck, Olsen and Ransom attempted
to isolate the supposed cartel effect of lawyer licensing by correlating lawyers'

51. See B. Peter Pashigian, The Market for Lawyers: The Determinants of the
DemandforandSupply ofLawyers, 20 J.L. & ECON. 53 (1977) (showing that the supply

of lawyers is determined mainly by business activity and earnings outside the legal
profession).
52. This effect may be exacerbated by the requirement that law schools be
nonprofit, which limits their incentives to respond to increases in the demand for lawyers.
See id.; see also Sherwin Rosen, The Market for Lawyers, 35 J.L. & EcoN. 215 (1992)
(presenting data as to number of and enrollment in law schools).
53. Many states also require the objective MPRE exam. However, since this exam
need be taken only once and its scores used in many states, it does not constrain multiple
licenses as much as a written exam.
54. The District of Columbia is the only jurisdiction that does not require prior
legal experience for admission on motion. The states vary slightly regarding what is
defined as "practice." Only Virginia requires the actual practice of law as distinguished
from law teaching or working as in-house counsel or a government lawyer. The
California requirement that lawyers admitted elsewhere take the California bar is
discussed infra note 158 and accompanying text.
55. These requirements are summarized at http://www.crossingthebar.com/admis
sionchart.htm (last edited Apr. 9, 2004).
56. For studies purporting to show that licensing increases price, see Haas-Wilson,
supranote 42 (showing effect of restrictions on the price of optometry services); Kleiner
& Kudrle, supra note 42 (showing that increased licensing restrictiveness raised prices
of dental services); Kleiner, supra note I (showing effect of licensing on earnings); and
Lawrence Shepard, Licensing Restrictionsand the Cost of DentalCare,21 J.L. & ECON.

187 (1978) (showing higher fees for dentists in states without reciprocity). But see
Edward Shinnick & Frank H. Stephen, ProfessionalCartels and Scale Fees: Chiselling
on the Celtic Fringe?, 20 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 407 (2000) (finding no evidence of

cartel pricing in Scotland and Ireland).
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income and the price of legal services with barriers to entry as indicated by such
factors as bar passage rates and residency requirements for admission.57 They
concluded that lawyers' income and prices correlated less with barriers to entry
than with market variables such as population density, growth, per capita income
and employment, with human capital variables such as lawyers' experience and
schooling, and with specific factors reflecting demand for legal services such as
the divorce rate. Also, the percentage of lawyers in the state population did not
depend on barriers to entry, but rather on the demand for lawyers as indicated by
employment in industries that tend to generate law business. On the other hand,
the study provided some support for the cartel theory by showing that regulatory
variables testing state restrictions on admission to the bar were jointly important
to lawyer earnings.58
The important question is whether any distortions in the market for lawyers
caused by lawyer licensing increase or decrease social welfare. If lawyer
licensing fails to exclude unskilled lawyers but excludes some skilled lawyers,
it prevents the efficient production and utilization of legal advice. Alternatively,
licensing may have little effect beyond that of private ordering and markets, so
that its costs outweigh its benefits.
Licensing may reduce social welfare even if it functions as intended in
screening less qualified practitioners. For example, licensing may leave lowerincome clients without legal help because they cannot afford licensed
practitioners,59 or at least may reduce competition and raise prices for low-end
customers.6 ° To the extent that income levels correlate with race or ethnicity,
licensing requirements may hurt members of racial minority groups.6
. 57. See Dean Lueck et al., Market andRegulatory Forces in the PricingofLegal
Services, 7 J. REG. EcON. 63 (1995).

58. See id. Although the study showed no significant correlation with the price of
legal services to clients and the hourly rates firms charged for individual lawyers'
services, lawyer earnings arguably measure the cartel effect more accurately than prices
because the latter depend partly on the cost of living in each locale. There was also no
significant correlation between some individual regulatory variables and lawyer earnings.
But in assessing whether state regulation restricts entry the rules should be viewed as a
package, with harsher restrictions in some areas substituting for laxer restrictions in
others.
59. See YOUNG, supra note 41, at 20-21. For criticisms of the bar exam
requirement as promoting this result, see Curcio, supra note 44, and Glen, supranote 44.
60. See J. Howard Beales, III, The Economics of Regulating the Professions, in
REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS: A PUBLIC POLICY SYMPOSIUM 125, 137-38 (Roger D.
Blair & Stephen Rubin eds., 1980); see also John R. Lott, Jr., Licensing and
Nontransferable Rents, 77 AM. ECON. REv. 453 (1987) (showing how non-transferable
professional licenses discourage some low-cost producers).
61. For discussions of the discriminatory effects of professional licensing laws, see,
for example, FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 150-51, YOUNG, supra note 41, at 75-80,
Barton, supra note 8, at 444, Curran, supra note 40, at 251, Richard B. Freeman, The
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/1
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Professional school accreditation requirements similarly may affect the cost of
legal services.62

Licensing laws also may reduce the quality of services clients of all types
actually receive by forcing them to substitute self-help or unqualified
practitioners for the lower-level but adequate practitioners licensing laws drive
out of the market.63 As Milton Friedman observed, requiring people to hire
licensed practitioners is like requiring them to have either Cadillacs or no
automobiles at all." This problem is graphically illustrated by a study showing
that licensing increased electrical shock cases as people substituted self-help for
licensed electricians.65
Ironically, the foregoing arguments suggest that licensing hurts the ones
who need it most, and helps those who need it least. Licensing is most important
in ensuring quality where clients are least able to self-protect, as in small
transactions where the costs of obtaining information outweigh the benefits," s or
where clients are relatively uneducated and unsophisticated. Yet at the lower
end of the market licensing laws most restrict the supply of services. Licensing
more accurately signals quality at the upper end of the market, but here large law
firms provide the same protection, and clients are more sophisticated.
3. Effect of Ethics Rules on Lawyer Competition
The state licensing system has important implications for the promulgation
and enforcement of ethical rules. Ethical rules have been characterized as
standard form contracts between lawyers and clients.67 But the contractual

Effect ofOccupationalLicensure on Black OccupationalAttainment, in OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSURE, supranote 1, at 165, Gellhom, supra note 45, at 18, and Hansen, supranote

44, at 1219-20 (discussing the discriminatory effects of the bar exam requirement).
62. See John S. Elson, The Governmental Maintenanceof the PrivilegesofLegal
Academia: A Case Study in Classic Rent-Seeking and a Challenge to our Democratic
Ideology, 15 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 269 (2001); George B. Shepherd & William
G. Shepherd, Scholarly Restraints? ABA Accreditation and Legal Education, 19
CARDOZO L. REv. 2091 (1998); George B. Shepherd, No African-American Lawyers
Allowed: The Inefficient Racism ofthe ABA 'sAccreditationofLaw Schools, 53 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 103 (2003). For a discussion of the analogous effect of medical school
accreditation, see RICHARD HARRISON SHRYOCK, MEDICAL LICENSING INAMERICA 16501965 (1967).
63. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 153, 156; YOUNG, supra note 41, at 78-79;
Leef, supra note 22, at 25-26.

64. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 153.
65. See Sidney L. Carroll & Robert J. Gaston, OccupationalRestrictions and the
Quality of Service Received: Some Evidence, 47 S. ECON. J. 959 (1981).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
67. See Jonathan R. Macey &Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Conflict
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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characterization is misleading because licensed lawyers are subject to the
disciplinary authority of the state in which they are licensed to practice, and to
the rules of the tribunal where their conduct or its predominant effect occurred.68
Ethical rules help support the price of legal services by maintaining lawyers'
status as a learned profession rather than merely purveyors of a commodity.69
Ethical rules constrain competition in several ways, including by preventing
lawyers from working for non-lawyer owned firms," and impeding protection
of firms' investments in business development by restricting non-competition
agreements." Perhaps most importantly, uniform ethical rules constrain efficient
forms of law firm organization, including multidisciplinary practice.72
C. The Politics ofLicensing
The politics of state licensing give reason to doubt that the social benefits
of the system outweigh the costs. Winning interest groups typically are those
who can most effectively organize to raise and spend political resources." They
tend to be relatively homogeneous groups that can cheaply and effectively
constrain members from free-riding off of co-members' expenditures and
efforts. 4 Lawyers would seem to fit this description, particularly because of
their regular professional contacts and ability to utilize preexisting bar
associations. They will, therefore, be able to out-lobby larger but more
fragmented groups of consumers and business clients. 5

ofInterest Regulation, 82 IOWA L. REV. 965 (1997).
68. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (2001) (amended 2003).
69. See POSNER, supranote 30, at 56; Ronald D. Rotunda, Professionalism,Legal

Advertising, andFree Speech in the Wake ofFlorida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 49 ARK. L.
REV. 703 (1997). Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price ofLaw: How the Marketfor Lawyers
Distorts the JusticeSystem, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 992 (2000), also notes how lawyers
gain from the professional nature of law practice, but views this as resulting largely from
the "natural" barrier of the scarce availability of the cognitive skills necessary to engage
in complex legal reasoning rather than from lawyers' rent-seeking. Both effects may be
at work.
70. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2003).

71. See id. R. 5.6. For a discussion of the professional self-interest basis of these
rules, see Ribstein, supra note 19.
72. See Ribstein, supra note 19; Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Law Firm
Structure and Choice of Law, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1161 (2001); infra Part I.D.2.
73. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).
74. See generally ROBERT E. MCCORMICK & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, POLITICIANS,
LEGISLATION, AND THE ECONOMY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTEREST-GROUP THEORY OF
GOVERNMENT( 1981); Robert D. Tollison, PublicChoiceandLegislation,74 VA. L. REV.

339, 361-62 (1988).
75. For similar concerns about professional regulation generally, see FRIEDMAN,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/1
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Lawyers can promote licensing laws not only by lobbying to pass and
enforce these laws, but also by directly participating in their enforcement. An
influential study showed that unauthorized practice laws were enforced mostly
by state bar unauthorized practice committees.76 The bar thereby avoids having
to get public prosecutors to take action in the face of public indifference to
unauthorized practice.77
One might wonder whether lawyers gain on balance from licensing laws,
since although they confer monopoly protection they also impose burdens on
lawyers. The answer is that existing lawyers, who exert political pressure in
favor of licensing, are "grandfathered" in under new licensing laws or increased
requirements and therefore need not pay for any monopoly benefits the license
confers."

Evidence that licensing standards rise with the supply of

professionals79 suggests that these standards are designed to help politically
influential professionals protect their income from erosion by new entrants. It
follows that licensing regulation will tend to persist irrespective of any social
welfare benefits because existing practitioners, who have paid the costs of the
license, would lose from deregulation."
D. Alternatives to State Licensing of Law Practice
Complete evaluation of the state licensing system requires comparisons with
other methods of regulating lawyers. The current system requires those who
wish to perform certain types of services in a particular state to obtain a license
from that state. The alternatives to state licensing discussed below are variations
on these three features. Section 1 discusses certification as distinguished from
mandatory licensing. Sections 2 and 3 discuss state regulation other than by the
state in which the attorney practices. Section 4 discusses federal licensing.
Section 5 discusses methods of attorney discipline other than licensing. The

supranote 1, at 143, and Gellhom, supra note 45, at 16-17.
76. Deborah L. Rhode, Policingthe ProfessionalMonopoly: A Constitutionaland
EmpiricalAnalysis of UnauthorizedPracticeProhibitions,34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 15-16

(1981).
77. Id. at 16.
78. See YOUNG, supra note 41, at 27.
79. See Alex Maurizi, OccupationalLicensing and the PublicInterest, 82 J. POL.

ECON. 399 (1974) (showing that pass rates for professional examinations for various
professions including law correlate with excess demand).
80. See YOUNG, supra note 41, at 27 (noting the "ratchet" and "escalator" effects
of professional regulation that tend toward increasing and against decreasing regulation
due to effects on existing practitioners); Barton, supranote 8, at 444; Curran, supranote
40, at 252; Leffler, supra note 22; B. Peter Pashigian, Has Occupational Licensing
Reduced GeographicalMobility and Raised Earnings?,in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE,
supra note 1, at 299; Wolfson et al., supra note 20.
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availability of these plausible alternatives to the current system puts additional
pressure on existing explanations for state licensing, and provides further need
for an alternative explanation for such licensing, such as that offered in this
Article.
1. Certification and Related Devices
Lawyers might be certified rather than licensed-that is, they could agree
to comply with certain standards, but be permitted to perform the identical
services without certification."' For the same reason that lawyers seek to allay
clients' concerns about lawyer quality through licensing requirements, lawyers
would have incentives to use nongovernmental bodies such as private
associations to signal their quality to clients.8 2 These associations could require
members to conform to their rules, backed by the power to expel members or sue
for fines. 3 Similarly, large law firms offer reputation bonds that secure the
performance of their members.8 Lawyers might be certified in particular
specialties even if they are also licensed. In general, eliminating licensing
requirements would permit practitioners to offer various levels of legal services

81. For comparisons between certification and licensing, see FRIEDMAN, supra
note 1, at 144; YOUNG, supra note 41, at 18-19; Beales, supra note 60, at 133; Kleiner,
supra note 1, at 192, 200; Leef, supra note 22, at 35-36.
82. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 146; Gellhorn, supra note 45, at 23; Leffler,
supra note 22, at 290. Analogously, firms have been shown to subject themselves
voluntarily to high-quality securities disclosure regimes in order to bond their disclosures.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listingsand
Stock Market Competitionon InternationalCorporateGovernance, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1757 (2002); Howell E. Jackson & Eric J. Pan, Regulatory Competition in International
Securities Markets: Evidence from Europe in 1999-PartI, 56 BUS. LAW. 653, 691
(2001) (finding that the market demanded more securities disclosures than required by
the minimum standards in E.U. directives, and noting that "market developments in
European capital markets to date do not offer support to critics of regulatory competition
who claim that the issuer choice proposals would prompt a race to the bottom in
international securities regulation"); Larry E. Ribstein, InternationalImplications of
Sarbanes-Oxley: Raising the Rent on US Law, 3 J. CORP. L. STUD. 299 (2003); Edward
B. Rock, Coming to America? Venture Capital,CorporateIdentity and U.S. Securities
Law (April 2002), in GLOBALMARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE LAWAND
GOVERNANCE IN A NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS (Curtis J. Milhaupt ed.,

forthcoming 2003), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstractid.=313419 (discussing
Israeli firms' incorporation in Delaware).
83. See Paul V. Dunmore & Haim Falk, Economic Competition Between
ProfessionalBodies: The CaseofAuditing, 3 AM. L. &ECON. REV. 302 (2001) (showing
that competition between professional auditing associations can effectively replace most
government regulation of auditors).
84. See infra text accompanying notes 108-09.
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at different
prices 5 and enable competition between certified and uncertified
86
lawyers.
Many arguments for licensing do not adequately distinguish between
licensing and certification. The relevant question is not whether there is an
information asymmetry between clients and lawyers, but whether licensing, with
all its costs, more efficiently addresses this asymmetry than certification. Private
certifiers do not necessarily offer less protection than state regulators, who rarely
use their powers to fine and jail noncomplying lawyers. Although consumers
would have to evaluate certifiers, information about large law firms and
certifying organizations is likely to be more cheaply available than that about
individual lawyers.
One possible objection to relying on certification is that private alternatives
to state licensing may not address social interests affected by law practice, such
as service to the poor, the general community or the interests of justice. State
laws emerge from a political process that arguably provides some accountability
to non-lawyer interests. But non-lawyer groups have little clout in state
licensing.87 Conversely, private associations have an incentive to improve
members' image through rules requiring public service as a condition of
certification.
2. Alternative Rules for Selecting State Licensing Regime
Lawyers might be regulated under state law but, as with corporations,
allowed to choose the applicable licensing and regulatory state without regard
to where they reside. 8 This approach is similar to the private ordering model
except that lawyers would be subject to some state enforcement mechanism and
the choice would be among fifty-one regulatory bodies rather than a potentially
much larger number of private organizations.8 9

85. See Beales, supranote 60, at 133; supratext accompanying note 64 (discussing
the problem with licensing of forcing consumers to buy high-priced/high-quality legal
services).
86. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 149.
87. See supra Part I.C.
88. This approach is discussed in more detail in Ribstein, supranote 72. See also
Chesterfield Smith, Time for a NationalPracticeof Law Act, 64 A.B.A. J. 557 (1978)
(advocating a national practice system in which states fullyrecognize lawyers' admission
in other states). A pure version of the choice of domicile approach that lets lawyers
practice in any court under their chosen rules probably would be unworkable because a
court needs to be able to apply a single set of rules to all those who appear before it.
Accordingly, courts should be able to enforce their own rules of court administration.
89. State regulators could choose to defer in some respects to rules of local bar
associations or lawyers and their clients contract for the licensing and ethical rules that
apply to particular representations. Cf. Task Force on Conflicts of Interest, Conflicts of
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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There are three main differences between this "corporate" model of lawyer
regulation and the current approach to determining the applicable regulatory
regime." First, it facilitates competition among regulatory regimes. If lawyers
need not tie their choice of regulation to their place of practice, they can shop
among all states for their preferred ethical rule. States would charge lawyers bar
admission fees for using their regulation and the states with the regulations
lawyers find most attractive would earn the most fees.
Second, the corporate model would facilitate adapting ethical rules to
varying types of practice. Lawyers could choose, for example, an urban state's
rules suited to large firms, or a more rural state's small-firm-type rules. Or states
could cater to particular types of law practice, such as multidisciplinary or
Internet-based.
Third, the corporate model allows each lawyer or firm to be governed by a
single set of rules regardless of where they practice. This reduces lawyers' costs
of learning and complying with the rules if they practice in many states. Fourth,
jurisdictional choice would facilitate state experimentation with various tradeoffs
between more client protection and lower cost of legal services.
A variation on the corporate system would be permitting limited choice in
particular circumstances. I have proposed letting multi-state law firms choose
a single regulatory regime that governs all lawyers in the firm as to rules that
have structural implications for law firms, including rules on who may own
equity in the firm, non-competition agreements and members' vicarious liability
for the firm's debts.9 ' The costs of subjecting law firms' lawyers to different
structural rules in different states make applying some variation of a corporatetype rule necessary to sustain nonuniform professional regulation.92
A system that lets lawyers choose from among state licensing regimes may
not be clearly more efficient than one in which lawyers can choose non-state
regulators such as firms or private associations. Once the law permits ex ante

Interest Issues, 50 Bus. LAW. 1381, 1426 (1995) (suggesting that firms include choice
of law clauses in engagement letters to deal with client conflict issues). This regime
would make it harder for states to discipline lawyers and to design or apply rules as
coherent bundles. As to the latter problem, see O'Hara & Ribstein, From Politics to
Efficiency, supra note 5, at 1192-94. Also, clients might find it harder to analyze
individual rules rather than simply making judgments about entire jurisdictions.
90. These differences between a conflict of laws regime in which states impose
their rules based on physical location and a contractual choice regime in which parties
choose the applicable law by contract at the time of the relevant conduct also exist in
other contexts. For an application to the Internet, see Ribstein & Kobayashi, State
Regulation,supra note 5.
91. See Ribstein, supra note 72.
92. The jurisdictional choice system proposed in Ribstein, supranote 72, can be
reconciled with the present Article because it would mostly preserve individual lawyers'
incentives regarding investments in local state law.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/1
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choice, why limit the choice to state regulatory bodies? One reason is that
clients face lower information costs in evaluating a limited number of state
licensing regimes than a potentially much larger number of private associations.
But perhaps for this reason only a few private organizations would emerge as
prominent and have signaling value for lawyers. Accordingly, there may be little
practical difference between the two regimes.
3. Permitting Practice Outside of Licensing State
A choice of state approach might preserve the basic outline of the current
system of licensing lawyers in their principal state of practice but loosen the rules
regarding practice outside the licensing state. The ABA and some states have
clarified the legality of current practices of permitting practice outside the
licensing state on a temporary basis, multi-state activities of in-house counsel,
and admission on motion of lawyers who are in good standing and have
practiced a certain number of years in another state.93 Alternatively, the rules
might permit lawyers licensed in a given state to practice anywhere else under
a uniform registration system.
4. Federal Licensing and Regulation
General arguments for licensing do not relate to whether the states or the
federal government will be doing the licensing. Congress can license lawyers
through its power to regulate such areas as tax, bankruptcy, patent, antitrust and
securities law. 94 Or Congress might broadly regulate law practice under its

Commerce Clause power. 95 Federal courts have the power to license lawyers and
to regulate at least some of their conduct. 96 In particular, federal regulation has

93. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2003); MJP Commission,supra

note 2.
94. See Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 384-85 (1963) (holding that under
Supremacy Clause federal and not state law controlled non-lawyers' right to practice
before Patent Office).
95. For recommendations and predictions concerning federalizing regulation of the
legal profession, see Stephen B. Burbank, State Ethical Codes and FederalPractice:
EmergingConflicts andSuggestionsforReform, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 969,974(1992);
Ted Schneyer, ProfessionalDisciplinein 2050: A Look Back, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 125,
129 (1991) (foreseeing creation of a federal commission to regulate professional service
providers); and Fred C. Zacharias, FederalizingLegal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335
(1994).
96. See generally Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal CourtAuthority
to Regulate Lawyers: A Practicein Search of a Theory, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1303 (2003)
(discussing potential sources of and recent cases on federal court power to regulate

lawyers).
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been recommended as a way to resolve the controversy over multidisciplinary
practice. 9' The federal regulation of securities lawyers is an important step
toward federal licensing of lawyers."8
A federal licensing system has two potential advantages over a state system.
First, lawyers exert significant control over state licensing. While lawyers
probably also would influence federal licensing, national consumer and business
groups may be better able to exert significant counter-pressure at that level.
Second, the rise of interstate law practice99 threatens the workability of a statebased system of lawyer regulation.
The federal government's role in lawyer regulation is not necessarily limited
to licensing. Congress could enact minimum standards for lawyer licensing and
let states regulate subject to those standards. Alternatively, lawyers' efforts to
manipulate the supply and price of legal services through professional licensing
and ethical rules could be addressed through antitrust laws.'
Federal regulation, however, is a dubious solution to problems with state
licensing. First, because federal regulation empowers consumer and other
interest groups instead of lawyers, it may just change the identity of the winners
rather than producing more efficient results.' Second, federal regulation would
substitute one-size-fits-all rules for variety among and competition between
licensing and ethical regimes.0 2 For example, states may vary as to whether they

97. See John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, MultidisciplinaryPracticeand
theAmerican Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulatingthe Delivery ofLegal
Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 150 n.356 (2000) (but
noting that congressional action probably not feasible); James P. Holden, Written
Remarks to the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Nov. 12, 1999),
available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/holden.html; see also Ted Schneyer,
MultidisciplinaryPractice,ProfessionalRegulation, andtheAnti-InterferencePrinciple
in LegalEthics, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1469, 1477 n.37 (2000) (noting that "Congress could
become a major player in the fight over MDP legalization").
98. See infra Part I.E.3.
99. See infra Part I.E.I.
100. See infra text accompanying note 129 (discussing federal antitrust concerns
regarding state unauthorized practice enforcement).
101. See Wolfram, supranote 11, at 706-07. An indication of the political power
of lawyers under federal licensing is the role the national bankruptcy bar has played in
the expansion of bankruptcy law and blocking procedural bankruptcy reforms. See
DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW INAMERICA

86-100 (2001).
102. See H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., Federalism and Choice of Law in the
Regulation ofLegal Ethics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 73 (1997).
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license lawyers at all.' 3 Third, significant federal encroachment
into a
1 4
traditionally state-dominated area may not be politically feasible. 1
Despite these problems, federal licensing might come to be seen as a
plausible alternative if state regulators continue to refuse to accommodate the
needs of modem law practice. Consumers and others may conclude that it is the
only way both to regulate lawyers and to weaken the lawyer cartel. While
lawyers might see federal regulation as the solution to the problems of state
regulation of multi-state practice, it is important to assess the full consequences
of abandoning state regulation, including the potential costs and benefits of
giving lawyers a stake in the law of the licensing state.
5. Alternative Methods of Lawyer Discipline
The discussion so far has focused on regulation that attempts to screen out
less qualified lawyers who would otherwise be able to compete for less informed
consumers. This amounts to regulating the inputs that determine the quality of
legal advice, including education and knowledge of the law. However, licensing
provides little assurance of quality.'0 5 Accordingly, it may be better to dispense
with licensing and regulate outputs to ensure lawyer quality, including through
malpractice liability and disciplinary proceedings. 0 6 Also, the law could
facilitate monitoring of lawyers' output by providing a readily accessible
database of lawsuits or disciplinary proceedings. The existence of such
alternatives casts further doubt on whether ensuring lawyer quality is a
convincing justification for lawyer licensing.
E. Current Challenges to State-of-PracticeLicensing
Fundamental changes in the scope and nature of law practice increase the
pressure to change or abandon the current system of state licensing of lawyers,
and therefore the need for a new public interest rationale for this system. Section
I discusses the increasingly interstate nature of law practice, including practice
through multi-state law firms. Interstate law practice makes state-based law
licensing more costly as well as politically suspect because lawmaking

103. This sort of variation is more defensible under the lawmaking-incentive
argument presented in this Article than under a client-protection theory. See infra Part
IV.D.
104. See generallyJonathan R. Macey, FederalDeference to LocalRegulatorsand
the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of
Federalism,76 VA. L. REv. 265 (1990).
105. See supra Part I.B. 1.
106. See YOUNG, supra note 41, at 18-19, 53; Barton, supra note 8, at 462.
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jurisdictions do not internalize regulatory costs." 7 Section 2 discusses new
technologies that blur the line between information and legal advice. Section 3
discusses perceived inadequacies of state regulation of lawyers that provide a
public interest argument for federalizing licensing and regulation of lawyers.
Section 4 discusses increasing judicial and federal regulatory scrutiny of
enforcement of unauthorized practice laws, which may force regulators to clarify
the scope of such laws and the policy basis of licensing lawyers.
1. Multi-State Law Practice
Law practice is becoming increasingly nationalized and internationalized.
A licensing system designed when law practice was confined within state
borders therefore seems anachronistic. In particular, the growth of multi-state
law firms and in-house corporate legal practice causes significant strains in the
current approach.
The growth of multi-state firms reflects both the increasing size and reach
of firms' clients and the increasing recognition of the governance advantages of
large law firms. Large law firms can provide client protection comparable to that
provided by ethical rules. A law firm can back its members' promises of highquality and honest performance by posting its reputation as a kind of bond that
transcends the reputations of its individual members.0 8 When law firms breach
their implicit promises of performance, the market exacts a penalty scaled to the
level of wrongdoing by devaluing the firm's reputation, and therefore reducing
the price it can charge for its services. 9
Reputation bonding has implications for law firms' structure and size." 0
The firm needs, among other things, a compensation mechanism that gives
partners an incentive to develop the firm's goodwill and not just their own
reputations. Non-competition clauses bind the partners to this sharing deal.
Also, larger firms can offer larger reputation bonds. In order to grow to its
optimal size, a law firm may need to leverage its reputation and expertise by
spreading across regions, specialties and disciplines.
Given large firms' potential for reducing lawyer-client agency costs, lawyer
regulation may be inefficient to the extent that it keeps these firms below their

107. In other words, the regulation involves "spillover" of regulatory costs on

parties outside the state. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 699-700 (5th ed. 1998); Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial
Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563, 568 (1983).

108. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
109. See Daniel R. Fischel, MultidisciplinaryPractice,55 BUS. LAW. 951 (2000);
Ribstein, supra note 19.
110. Ribstein, supra note 19.
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optimal size."' The current approach to regulating lawyers based on where they
practice promotes inefficient regulation of law firms. Since the lawyers based
in each office of a multi-state firm are practicing law in that state,' 1 2 they are
subject to that state's licensing requirements and regulation. Thus, a multi-state
firm's internal structure must comply with the rules of every state in which
lawyers affiliated with the firm are based, including every state in which the firm
has a branch or headquarters office.' For example, if some state ethical rules
do not allow enforcement of strong non-competition clauses, a nationwide firm
might have to choose between providing for the most efficient firm-wide
incentive structure and maintaining a branch in the regulating state. This
virtually compels uniformity of legal rules regarding law firm structure and
inhibits evolution of and competition among these rules.'""
Ethical restrictions on non-lawyer ownership of law firms" 5 represent the
most important constraint on law firm size and structure. Regulating law firm
capital structure has important structural consequences. "6 Among other things,
requiring all law firm owners to be lawyers makes law firms less hospitable for
non-lawyers than if non-lawyers could share ownership and control. 7 Although
law firms might affiliate with multidisciplinary offices injurisdictions that allow
them, this structure can entail significant costs. The firm may fimd it difficult to
provide for the monitoring and incentives it needs to maintain its reputation bond
where professionals in one state's office have no financial interest in another
state's office. Moreover, it may be hard to determine what types of affiliations
constitute sufficient integration to subject the firm's lawyers to rules against
multidisciplinary practice in states where they are licensed."' Accordingly, to
be safe, law firms must comply with the most restrictive state rules on
multidisciplinary practice.

111. Id. at 1719-20.
112. See supra text accompanying note 11.
113. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-360
(1991). Indeed, a lawyer working for a multi-state firm may be subject to the rules of his
licensing state even if he practices in a permissive state if his firm handles legal matters
related to the licensing state. See Michigan State Bar, Standing Comm. on Prof'I and
Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-225, 1995 WL 68958 (Feb. 1, 1995) (holding that a Michigan
lawyer does not violate Michigan rules by having an ownership interest in a D.C. law
firm that has non-lawyer partners permitted by D.C., but not Michigan, rules, and does
not handle "Michigan legal matters"); Ribstein, supra note 72 (discussing regulation of
multi-jurisdictional law firms).
114. Ribstein, supra note 72.
115. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2003).

116. See generally Ribstein, supranote 19; Ribstein, supranote 72.
117. See Ribstein, supra note 19, at 1725.
118. See Ribstein, supra note 72, at 1172-73.
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The rise of multidisciplinary practice puts pressure on the state-based
system for regulating lawyers.
Although states can block entry of
multidisciplinary firms under the current system, the status quo nevertheless
might break down in the face of the developments described above. Clients may
seek more efficient delivery of legal and other professional service, large U.S.
law firms may face competition from accounting and European-based law firms,
and even smaller boutique firms could gain by engaging in multidisciplinary
practice."' With lawyers and clients clamoring for change, a stronger rationale
must be found for the current system.
2. The Technological Threat to Traditional Law Practice
New technologies, particularly including computer software and the
Internet, could fundamentally change the provision of legal advice. First,
websites can convey large quantities of legal information directly to consumers.
This reduces not only the need for legal advice, but also the information
asymmetry between lawyer and client that provides the current rationale for state
licensing.
Second, Intemet services and computer software blur the line between
information provision and legal advice. This is partly because of the potential
for interactivity, where information is provided based on the user's particular
need or question, just as in a traditional lawyer-client setting. 2 '
These new technologies force more precise delineation of the activities that
require a law license. They also challenge state-by-state licensing by permitting
lawyers to interact with clients in states in which the lawyers are not licensed.
Firms and individuals exploiting the new technologies may try to reduce legal
impediments to lucrative business opportunities. Moreover, the fact that Internet
law practice can provide effective legal assistance on routine matters to a lowincome clientele makes opposition by the ABA politically unattractive. In
general, these new business methods demand a clearer theory of the appropriate
scope of regulation than is provided by the existing analytical framework.

119. See Fischel, supra note 109, at 972.
120. Examples of Interet-based document preparation services include http://ww
w.mylawyer.org/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2004) (promoting automated legal documents
"powered by our easy-to-use Rapidocs software.... Our smart forms include complete
and detailed instructions on how to create/use the documents and how to file them in
court if necessary."); and http://www.completecase.com (last visited Mar. 16, 2004)
(stating that "[o]ur simple and inexpensive process will enable you to complete your
divorce documents from the comfort of your home, without incurring the cost of an
attorney, or dealing with lengthy completion and delivery periods.... You will receive
completed documents, explanations and instructions. The documents are customized to
the state or province you live in, your children, your income, your assets and other factors
in your case.").
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3. Inadequacy of State Regulation of Lawyers
State licensing not only may impose extra burdens on law practice, but also
may result in a suboptimal amount of regulation. Since lawyers essentially
determine the substance and application of state licensing requirements and
regulation, 2 ' licensing requirements are more likely to protect the lawyers'
monopoly than to impose restrictions that reduce the profitability of law practice.
An important example of this phenomenon is imposing duties on corporate
lawyers to report client fraud. While firms may be willing to pay lawyers to
perform this reporting function in order to signal their honesty,'22 markets alone
may not produce the socially optimal amount of reporting. Regulation that
imposes this obligation on lawyers may reduce lawyers' profits if they cannot
fully recoup costs by increasing prices. Lawyers therefore may resist imposing
these obligations under state law, increasing political pressure to impose the
obligations under federal law, where non-lawyer interest groups are more
powerful.
This is, indeed, the way the issue of lawyers' reporting obligations played
out in Enron and other recent corporate frauds. States had resisted imposing
broad reporting obligations as recently as the 2000 revision of the ABA Model
Rules." 3 The political pressure to do something about corporate fraud resulted
in the imposition on securities lawyers of a broad federal reporting obligation.'24
This law could intensify debate on whether lawyers are more appropriately
regulated at the federal or the state level, particularly in areas significantly
affected by federal law. 2 ' The answer should depend on a full analysis of the
justifications for state licensing and regulation of lawyers, including the lawyersas-lawmakers explanation offered in this Article.

121. See supra Part I.C.
122. See Painter, supra note 35.
123. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2001) (amended 2003);
Ethics 2000 Commission Revision to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13,
availableat http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rule I 13.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2002).
124. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. 2003); 17 C.F.R.
§ 205.1-7 (2003) (SEC rules adopted under Section 307 providing, among other things,
for attorney reporting obligations).
125. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agendafor the
SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1293, 1316 (2003) (concluding that "private self-regulation
of attorneys through bar associations means the continued government of the guild, by
the guild, and for the guild .... SEC rules thus offer the best prospect for a relevant,
precise response that avoids pointless disparity while clearly notifying securities attorneys
that-like it or not-they are gatekeepers. To paraphrase Clemenceau, professions are
too important to be left to the professionals.").
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4. Attack on Unauthorized Practice Laws
State licensing laws are enforced primarily through prosecutions under state
unauthorized practice statutes.1 6 The vague definition of the practice of law
under these statutes potentially reaches many different types of information,
including title searches, and filling in forms to obtain uncontested divorces,
probate estates or enter bankruptcy, as well as books, software and websites
containing discussions of law, legal forms or advice on particular legal issues.'27
There are significant policy issues concerning the appropriate breadth of
unauthorized practice laws, particularly where they bar performance of services
that do not require skills learned in law school or tested on the bar exam. The

justifications for prohibiting unlicensed practitioners from engaging in borderline
law practice are particularly relevant in determining whether restricting such
activities is contrary to the First Amendment or, to the extent done by
professional associations, the antitrust laws. 2 ' Issues concerning the borderline
practice of law are likely to intensify with the rise of the new technologies
discussed above in Section 2. Indeed, the Federal Trade Commission and the
Department of Justice recently expressed concern over bar prosecutions and the
vagueness of unauthorized practice provisions.' 29

126. See Center For Prof I Responsibility, American Bar Association, 1999 Survey
ofUnauthorizedPracticeofLaw Committees (1999), availableat http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/model-def/model def statutes.pdf (comprehensively summarizing these statutes).
127. See generally Rhode, supranote 76 (comprehensively analyzing the law and
presenting data on unauthorized practice enforcement).
128. See id. at 53-55, 62-96 (analyzing First Amendment and antitrust issues).
129. See Letter from Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice to
Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law, State Bar of Georgia (Mar. 20,
2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/v030007.htm (Re: Comments on Potential
Unlicensed Practice of Law Opinion Regarding Real Estate Closing Activity); Letter
from Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice to Task Force on the Model
Definition of the Practice of Law, American Bar Association (Dec. 20, 2002), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/12/lettertoaba.htm (Re: Comments on the American Bar
Association's Proposed Model Definition of the Practice of Law); Letter from Federal
Trade Commission and Department of Justice to Ethics Committee, North Carolina State
Bar (Dec. 14, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov.be/v020006.htm (Re: North
Carolina State Bar Opinions, 2001-4 and 2001-8 Restricting Involvement of NonAttorneys in Real Estate Closings and Refinancing Transactions). It is at least potentially
significant that the current chair of the FTC, Timothy J. Muris, has expressed support for
applying the antitrust laws to professionals. See Timothy J. Muris, California Dental
Association vs. Federal Trade Commission: The Revenge of Footnote 17, 8 SuP. CT.
ECON. REv. 265 (2000). McChesney & Muris, supra note 23, also presents evidence
inconsistent with the efficiency of professional regulation, specifically of price
advertising by lawyers.
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H.

AN ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENT: LAWYERS AND
STATE LAWMAKING

Based on the foregoing discussion, there would seem to be little reason to
maintain the current system of state licensing of lawyers. Information
asymmetries between lawyers and clients do not clearlyjustify lawyer regulation.
Moreover, state licensing of lawyers seems an inappropriate way of responding
to this problem, particularly compared with alternative solutions such as
certification. Nor does lawyer licensing help ensure that lawyers will serve the
public good. Indeed, lawyer licensing would seem to hurt the very people who
most need protection-the poor and disadvantaged who cannot pay the highly
trained lawyers the system requires. And even if some licensing system were
justified, it is not clear that states, rather than the federal government, should
administer this system, particularly given the increasingly interstate nature of law
practice.
However, the existing theory misses a principal benefit of this system.
Specifically, lawyer licensing, by giving lawyers exclusive rights to practice the
law of a particular state, also gives them incentives to maintain the efficiency of
the law of that state. In other words, what would seem to be the main drawback
of lawyer licensing-that it restricts competition in the legal services
market-emerges as an important argument for maintaining the system. This
rationale justifies not only the basic concept of state licensing of lawyers, but
also licensing requirements that demand qualifications beyond those needed to
protect clients. To the extent that lawyers are expected to be lawmakers, they
should be trained and screened to perform their lawmaking function.
Subpart A introduces the analysis by discussing the role lawyers actually
play in state lawmaking. Subpart B discusses how lawyer licensing combines
with other legal rules, including those governing choice of law, to give lawyers
incentives to engage in lawmaking activities. Subpart C discusses alternative
means of promoting lawyers' participation in lawmaking.
A. Evidence of Lawyers' Participation
The lawmaking incentive argument for state licensing depends on whether
lawyers can and do actually play a role in state lawmaking. It is important in this
regard to distinguish between lawyers' roles as advocates or representatives of
others and lawyers' work on their own behalf. Lawyers may be public servants
in acting as legislators and judges. They also may act on behalf of specific
clients as advocates, lobbyists and drafters of private codes. 3 ' The important

130. With respect to the latter activity, see infra Part II.C. For an analysis focusing
on lawyers' participation in lawmaking as advocates in litigation, see Bruce H. Kobayashi
and Larry E. Ribstein, Class Action Lawyers as Lawmakers, U. I1l. Public Law Research
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incentives in these contexts are those of the public or clients, with the lawyers'
personal interests mattering only in determining how well lawyers further their
principals' objectives. By contrast, the important question for present purposes
is lawyers' role as lawmakers on their own behalf, and how licensing affects
this role.
Lawyers clearly see their individual, nonrepresentative participation in
lawmaking as part of their self-identification as a profession. Lawyers'
participation in furthering the rule of law has been cited as a justification for
licensing lawyers' and for requiring lawyers to reside in the licensing state.' 32
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide that lawyers should spend
part of their time in "participation in activities for improving the law, the legal
system or the legal profession."' 33 Comment 8 to the Rule explains that this
provision "recognizes the value of lawyers engaging in activities that improve
the law, the legal system or the legal profession" and includes "legislative
lobbying to improve the law, the legal system or the profession."
There is evidence that lawyers do spend substantial time in lawmaking
activities. 4 Lawyers' role in writing Delaware corporate laws has been
documented and discussed.'3 Moreover, an extensive study of the adoption of
limited liability company laws demonstrated lawyers' major role in writing and

Paper No. 4-03 (Feb. 2004), availableathttp://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmn?abstract
id=501548.
131. See Barton, supranote 8, at 479-81; see also MJP Commission, supra note
2 (noting that state licensing helps maintain a locally active bar, but without specific
reference to lawmaking activities).
132. Chief Justice Rehnquist cited lawyers' role in lawmaking as ajustification for
state residency requirements for lawyers notwithstanding the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. See Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274,
290-94 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist said that a
State has a substantial interest in creating its own set of laws responsive to its
own local interests, and it is reasonable for a State to decide that those people
who have been trained to analyze law and policy are better equipped to write
those state laws and adjudicate cases arising under them.
Id. at 292 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Since this Article's theory focuses on incentives
to participate in lawmaking rather than the lawmakers' information, it does not directly
provide an argument for residency requirements. Requiring residency may be a way of
binding lawyers to particular states, but this also can be accomplished by the other
barriers to multi-state bar membership discussed infra Part II.B.3.
133. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (b)(3) (2003).

134. Given lawyers' direct participation in law reform discussed in the text, it
follows that amounts spent by state bar associations for lobbying would not accurately
reflect the extent of lawyers' role in lawmaking.
135. See S. Samuel Arsht, A History of Delaware Corporation Law, I DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1, 17-21 (1976); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an InterestGroup Theory of Delaware CorporateLaw, 65 TEX. L. REv. 469 (1987).
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promoting these statutes."36 Discussing the history of adoption of such laws in
forty-five of the fifty-one U.S. jurisdictions, the study showed that lawyers,
acting on their own behalf, usually through their local state bar, appeared to be
the major impetus for adoption in thirty-two of thesejurisdictions, and significant
participants in an additional six states.'37
Lawyers, like other professionals, may be better able than nonprofessional
groups to overcome collective action or free-rider problems inherent in political
activity. 3 ' One way for a group to overcome collective action problems is by
undertaking political activity as a byproduct of its other functions, thereby
incurring no marginal cost for political organization.'39 This applies to
professional associations, including bar associations, which are organized
primarily to facilitate information exchange and networking among members."4
Lawyers, however, play a special role in the lawmaking process as
compared with other interest groups, including business and accounting groups
that also influence state business legislation.' 4' First, lawyers already have
expertise about the law that their rivals must acquire or hire in order to be able
to lobby successfully.' 42 Thus, lawyers need not rely on third parties to translate
the issues they care about into specific laws and lawmaking strategies.
Second, lawyers have incentives to participate in law reform benefits
beyond any advantages they might gain from enacting specific laws. Lawyers
as a group acquire an aura of professionalism from these activities. 43 Individual

136. Carol R. Goforth, The Rise of the Limited Liability Company: Evidence of a
Race Between the States, but Heading Where?, 45 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1193 (1995).
137. A possible problem with this example is that lawyers would have a special
interest in LLC legislation that may not apply to other legislation-that is, an incentive
to push a new form of limited liability entity for their own practices. On the other hand,
it is arguably relevant that the LLC form can be used in all states by nonprofessional
firms. Also, lawyers obtained onlymarginal advantages from LLC legislation, since they
had access to other limited liability vehicles that afford lawyers the same liability
protection. See generally ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND
RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS, THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
AND THE UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7.04 (2003); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN &
ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES ch. 15

(2003). The point for present purposes is only to show that lawyers can play a substantial
role in law reform, not that they will do so in all situations in which it is efficient. This
broader issue is discussed below in Part II.C.
138. As to these problems, see supra text accompanying note 74.
139. See OLSON, supra note 73.
140. See Paul H. Rubin & Martin J. Bailey, The Role of Lawyers in Changingthe
Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 807 (1994).
141. These groups played significant roles in the enactment of LLC statutes in
several states. See Goforth, supra note 136.
142. See Macey & Miller, supra note 135, at 508-09.
143. See POSNER, supra note 30, at 56. This may explain the Model Rule discussed
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lawyers can enhance their personal reputations for expertise by drafting
legislative proposals and by advertising their efforts through such activities as
continuing legal education lectures.'"
Third, lawyers can influence their state's law other than by directly
participating in lawmaking. For example, they can earn money and reputation
benefits by writing forms, manuals, and treatises. These materials have been
characterized as part of a "network" that increases the value of a state's law.'45
Fourth, large law firms can help lawyers act collectively. These firms can
allocate members' efforts to political and law-reform activities, and can
internalize the reputation benefits of members' participation."' Lawyers who
practice alone or in small firms may have less flexibility in allocating their time
to activities that cannot be billed to specific clients.
B. Lawyers' Incentive to Participate
This Subpart shows how licensing lawyers to practice in a particular state
gives lawyers an incentive to participate in law reform by ensuring that the value
inherent in a state's body of law will be shared by a particular group of
practitioners. This puts the welfare effects of lawyer licensing discussed above
in Part I in a different light. The barriers lawyer licensing places on entry and
movement may increase social welfare as compared to a regime without
licensing if lawyers contribute to the efficiency of state law. At the same time,
data showing that lawyers gain from barriers to entry might reflect the value of
the law of the licensing state. This theory therefore provides a potential
argument in favor of lawyer licensing to the extent that lawyers have incentives
to make state law more efficient. 47
Section 1 provides an overview of the theory. The remainder of this
Subpart discusses the conditions for the creation of lawyers' rights in state law
and how these conditions relate to licensing and other laws. As discussed in
Section 2, the law-creation argument supports requiring a license to practice at
least some types of law. Section 3 shows how the law-creation argument further

supra text accompanying note 133.
144. Although these reputation benefits may not depend on lawyers' having a
special interest in a particular state's law, they arguably enhance any incentives to work
on a particular state's law that state licensing creates. See infra text accompanying note
154.
145. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of
Contracts,81 VA. L. REv. 757 (1995).
146. Firms will play this role only if they can protect the reputation capital they
create in the process, as through enforceable non-competition agreements that encourage
lawyers to contribute to the firm's reputation rather than their own client-building
activities. See Ribstein, supra note 19; supra Part I.B.3.
147. Lawyers' incentives to favor efficient laws are discussed infra Part III.B. 1.
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implies that lawyers must be tied to courts and clients located in particular states
by being required to obtain costly licenses to practice law in those states. Section
4 shows how lawyers' incentives depend on choice of law, jurisdiction and
forum rules that tie application of a state's law to the enacting state's residents
and courts.
1. An Overview of the Theory
Whether lawyers will invest resources in developing state law depends on
the extent to which others will free-ride off these investments. Licensing gives
lawyers a kind of property right in their state's law in the form of exclusive rights
to represent clients in the licensing state and to practice in that state's courts.' 48
Thus, to the extent that the quality of a state's law induces people to locate in a
state and litigate in the state's courts, licensing helps lawyers capture these
advantages to the exclusion of non-lawyers and out-of-state lawyers. A state's
law therefore comprises part of the value of that state's law licenses. The
monopoly profits that lawyers earn because of licensing are, in effect, the price
consumers of law (i.e., clients) pay to lawyers for participating in lawmaking.
These incentive effects are an important function of lawyer licensing apart from
protecting individual clients or maintaining a lawyer cartel.' 49
This argument does not mean that lawyer licensing, to be efficient, must
give lawyers perfect incentives to participate in lawmaking in the sense of
eliminating free-riders. Rather, the argument is that lawyer licensing may be
preferable to a system in which there are no barriers to the practice of law. To
be sure, stricter barriers would increase lawyers' property rights in law. But the
costs of more stringent lawyer licensing may outweigh its benefits in terms of
incentives to produce law, particularly since lawyers have reputation and other

148. This property right in state law created by the license should be distinguished
from the property right in the license itself. See supranote 20 and accompanying text.
Lawyers' rights in law deal with the non-excludability aspect of the public good nature
of law. Law would still have the public good quality of non-rivalrousness in the sense
that the use of law by some does not reduce its value to others. These two aspects of
public goods are distinguished in J.G. Head, Public Goods and Public Policy, 17 PUB.
FIN. 197 (1962). With respect to general property rights of excludability, use and
alienability, see Harold Demsetz, Property Rights, in 3 NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY,
supra note 40, at 144-45. Law licenses differ from the standard definition of property
because the licenses themselves (as distinguished from other components of firm
goodwill) are inalienable. Inalienability may reduce lawyers' incentive to improve state
law by reducing their ability to capitalize on the improvement. However, it is not critical
to my analysis whether lawyers' exclusive rights in their state's laws are technically
"property" rights or, as discussed in the text, provide perfect incentives.
149. See supra text accompanying note I (discussing cartel effects of lawyer
licensing).
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costs include not only licensing's effect on the supply and mobility of lawyers,'
but also the negative effects of restricting access to efficient laws.' 52
Licensing might seem to be unnecessary for incentive purposes because
lawyers earn individual reputation benefits from participating in state lawmaking
even if they do not share in the value of the law they create.' But licensing
explains why lawyers would seek reputation benefits through state lawmaking
efforts rather than from other activities. In the absence of exclusive benefits
from the local state law, lawyers might seek to enhance their reputations by
participating in uniform and federal lawmaking and engaging in forms of service
other than participation in lawmaking.""
It is important to consider the lawmaking-incentive theory of lawyer
licensing in the context of the overall welfare effects of lawyer licensing.
Without licensing there would be more competition to provide advice about the
law. This may reduce the price and increase the quality of legal advice,
depending on the validity of the traditional consumer-protection arguments for
licensing. While lawyer licensing may reduce the overall quality and increase
overall price of legal advice, it also may increase the quality of law. This effect
on the quality of law should be balanced against, or added to, the other effects
of lawyer licensing.
2. Licensing the Practice of Law
Lawyers' incentive to participate in making the law of the state in which
they practice depends on whether new entrants can free-ride off of lawyers'
investment in lawmaking. Requiring a license to practice under a state's law
helps serve this function by giving licensees exclusive rights to practice under
a particular law, and thereby in effect permitting licensees to charge clients for
use of this law. This includes licensing at least some types of trial and
transactional work that involve applications of legal expertise. In other words,
any law-creation benefits of law licensing would undercut arguments for
deregulating law practice. It would also justify requiring a law license as

150. See infra text accompanying note 220.
151. See supra Part I.B.2.
152. This is analogous to the defense of incomplete protection by trade secret law.
See David D. Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP.
61(1991).
153. See supra text accompanying note 144.
154. This is subject to the qualification that state licensing may operate to deter
investments lawyers otherwise would make in laws other than those of the licensing state.
See infra text accompanying note 288.
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distinguished from simply enabling practitioners to earn a certificate if they
choose to do so.'"
3. Tying Lawyers to States
Limiting free-riding off lawyers' investment in state law requires barriers
not only to the practice of law generally, but also to the practice of law in a
particular state. Although such licensing may not prevent all free-riding, in this
case by other licensed lawyers in the state, it at least prevents free-riding by
lawyers from other states.
Perhaps the most important barrier to entry to law practice in a state is the
requirement to take a bar exam. The bar exam usually requires months of study
and the risk of embarrassing failure. 56 That states pass a very high percentage
of applicants if they take the exam enough times 57 suggests that the bar exam is
more a price of admission than an effective screen. On the other hand, the bar
exam probably deters some people from attempting to obtain a license. Only
four jurisdictions pass fewer than sixty percent of those taking a particular test.
These include Louisiana, where the low rate may reflect the state's idiosyncratic
civil law system; the District of Columbia, which is unique in admitting lawyers
on motion without prior experience elsewhere; and California, which uses its bar
exam to screen graduates of unaccredited California schools.' 8 The fourth state
is Delaware, whose low passage rate may be particularly significant for present
purposes. Since Delaware is the most prominent example of a state where
lawyers have played an important role in maintaining the state's law, this
provides some anecdotal evidence of the role of state licensing in encouraging
lawyers' participation in lawmaking.
An additional entry barrier is rules that effectively discourage lawyers from
obtaining and maintaining licenses in several states, including annual fees,

155. See supra Part I.D. I (distinguishing licensing and certification systems); infra
Part IV.B (discussing appropriate scope of licensing requirements under lawmakingincentive theory).
156. See Kleiner, supra note 1, at 193.
157. See George M. Craw, So You Passedthe Bar. Big Deal,THE RECORDER, May
1, 2000, at 4. The first-time pass rate has, however, been shrinking in recent years. See
Deborah J. Merritt et al., Raisingthe Bar: A Social Science CritiqueofRecent Increases
to PassingScores on the Bar Exam, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 929 (2001).

158. This affects California's granting of reciprocity to lawyers from other states,
since admitting graduates of non-California schools who have not taken the California
bar would discriminate against similarly situated graduates of California schools. A
California task force recently studied the issue but declined to change the rule requiring

lawyers to take the bar exam. See CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT ADVISORY

TASK FORCE
ON MULTUURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 39 (Jan. 7,

2002), availableat http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/finalmjprept .pdf.
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mandatory continuing legal education, examination requirements for licensed
lawyers as well as new applicants, and requirements for maintaining an office in
the licensing state.'
Bar admission buys at least two important privileges. First, lawyers may
appear in the courts of the states in which they are licensed. This may be
significant even if their clients reside elsewhere because clients may want to have
the same lawyers or firms handle both their litigation and planning work in order
to reduce search costs and realize economies of scope, particularly from sharing
information among lawyers and across cases.
Second, a state license confers the exclusive right to practice on behalf of
clients located in the state. Lawyers gain a competitive advantage from physical
proximity to their clients. Even if lawyers can conduct some activities in a state
without being licensed there, a license allows lawyers to meet regularly with
clients under circumstances that clearly would constitute practicing law in that
state.'60 A client would want to hire legal advisors and planners whose offices
are near the firm's headquarters or other major location. A licensing requirement
therefore protects lawyers from competition for transactional work by out-ofstate lawyers.
The effect on lawyers' incentives of the privileges conferred by licensing
is clarified by comparing the current system of lawyer regulation with the
alternative approaches discussed above.' If legal advisors need not obtain any
license to practice law, they would have to compete with everyone, regardless of
location, who chooses to give legal advice. Anyone who sought to invest in a
state's law therefore would face a world of free-riders. A federal licensing
system would limit who could give legal advice but would not address freeriding on investments in the law of a particular state. Lawyers might invest in
federal rather than state law, but would then face potential free-riding by the
entire national bar.'62 Finally, under a system that lets lawyers contract for the
applicable regulatory system irrespective of their place of practice, lawyers could
represent clients and practice anywhere, regardless of whether they have invested

159. See supra text accompanying note 49. As to residency requirements, see
Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 68-70 (1988) (noting Virginia's
requirement that lawyers admitted on motion maintain an office in the state as a reason
why residency requirements were unnecessary to ensure a link between the state and its
licensed lawyers).
160. See articles cited supranote 11.
161. See supra Part I.D.
162. The federal government could license legal specialties, which could then
internalize the benefits of lawmaking efforts at the federal level. An important advantage
of state licensing of specialties is facilitating variation in licensing requirements. See
infra text accompanying notes 285.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/1

36

Ribstein: Ribstein: Lawyers as Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing
2004]

LAWYERS AS LAWMAKERS

in the state's law, thereby increasing potential free-riders and deterring
63
investments in lawmaking. 1
State variations may provide evidence supporting the law-creation
argument. For example, one might expect to see higher barriers to enter a
Sunbelt state where lawyers are seeking to retire or practice part of the year.'"
States' exclusion of "snowbirds" may have an efficiency rationale under the
theory proposed in this Article. Retirees are likely to have higher discount rates
than younger lawyers, and therefore are less likely to invest in development of
a state's law that has long-term payoffs, and more likely to free-ride off of other
lawyers' investments.
4. Tying Practice of a State's Law to the Enacting State
Tying lawyers to particular states gives them an interest in the courts and
clients of that state, but not necessarily in that state's law because any lawyer can
advise on the law of any state. Indeed, as between the lawyer licensed to practice
in state A and the lawyer in state B who has regular contact with a client who
seeks advice under state A's law, the state B lawyer may be better able to get the
client's business because the client values regular contact with the lawyer.' 65 It
seems to follow that a lawyer licensed in state B would have no more reason to
invest in state B than in state A law. Thus, in order to create rights in law, a
lawyer's license to practice in a particular state must give the lawyer preferred
access to that state's law. This requires tying the law to the courts and clients of
the enacting state.
This is done in several ways. First, judges applying modem approaches to
choice of law tend to apply their own state's law.'66 Thus, while an Idaho lawyer
can become expert in Delaware law, the lawyer still may have to litigate in
Delaware courts, and therefore get admitted in Delaware or affiliate with a
Delaware lawyer, to be able to count on litigating cases under Delaware law.'67

163. However, this Article's j ustification for lawyer licensing does not necessarily
depend on the absence of free-riding, but only on licensing's reducing free-riding enough
to give lawyers some incentive to participate in lawmaking. See supratext accompanying
note 150.
164. See Kleiner, supra note 1.
165. See Macey & Miller, supra note 135, at 493-94.
166. For studies showing pro-plaintiff, pro-resident and pro-forum biases see
Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice of Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 357 (1992), Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and EmpiricalAnalysis of
Choiceof Law, 24 GA. L. REv. 49, 81-89 (1989), and Stuart E. Thiel, Choice ofLaw and
the Home-CourtAdvantage: Evidence, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 291 (2000).
167. The courts of Delaware (or some other state) may offer advantages regardless
of which state's law they apply, such as speedy and expert resolution of cases. See
Romano, Law as Product,supranote 6. However, this relates to the state government's
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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It follows that an Idaho lawyer might prefer that her clients choose to be
governed by Idaho law, and therefore would have an incentive to invest in Idaho
rather than in Delaware law.
Second, under the forum non conveniens doctrine, courts may refuse to hear
cases that are more conveniently heard elsewhere, including because they require
application of another state's law. 6 ' Judges might apply forum non conveniens
because they hope that other courts will reciprocate, so the courts of each state
retain control over that state's law, or because they gain little reward from the
effort expended in deciding precedents under another state's law.' 69
Third, whether a state's law applies to a particular party depends to some
extent on the party's contacts with the state. Default choice of law rules for
contract actions look to the location ofthe parties and the relevant transaction. 7 °
If the parties contract for the application of a particular state's law, enforcement
of that contract may depend on whether the chosen state has a "substantial
relationship" to the parties or transaction or on the chosen state's "interest" in the
issue.'' Parties' contacts with the designated jurisdiction are a significant factor
in enforcing choice of law clauses.' Thus, interstate companies can expect the

investments in the court system rather than lawyers' investments in the law.
168. See, e.g., Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 130 (1933). For a
discussion of the relevance of forum non conveniens to Delaware lawyers' interest in
Delaware law, see Macey & Miller, supranote 135, at 497-98. Note that the applicable
law is only one factor considered in forum non conveniens. See Koster v. Am.
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1947); RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 262-78 (4th ed. 2001); 15 C. WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3828 (2d ed. 1986).

169. For this reason, even if a court is willing to apply the law of another state, its
opinions on that law may be less clear or elaborate than opinions on its own law.
170. See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 188(2) (1971) (listing

factors for determining law applicable to breach of contract, including place of
contracting, negotiation, performance, subject matter, and location of the parties).
171. Id. § 187(2).

172. In a study of seven hundred cases involving application and enforcement of
contractual choice of law clauses, in 429 of the 590 cases in which the clauses were
enforced, one or both of the parties resided in the designated state, while in 143 cases the
opinion did not clearly identify contacts with the designated state, and in only eighteen
cases parties clearly did not reside in the designated state. See Ribstein, FromEfficiency
to Politics, supra note 5, at 376-77. Delaware Code Annotated 6 Section 18-109(d)
(1999) seems explicitlyto make litigation in the state's courts a condition of enforcement
by authorizing limited liability company agreements that provide that a manager or
member may consent to be subject to the nonexclusive jurisdiction of the courts of a
specified jurisdiction or the exclusive jurisdiction of the Delaware courts. However, Elf
Atochem North America, Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286 (Del. 1999), interpreted the statute

as not precluding agreements vesting exclusive jurisdiction in a non-Delaware court.
This holding in effect elevates Delaware's policy of enforcing contracts over its policy
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/1
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law of their headquarters state to be particularly important. Moreover, a firm that
seeks to avoid a particular state's law needs to avoid "minimum contacts" with
that state that would suffice under the Due Process Clause to bring the firm into
court there.' 73 It follows that states with business-friendly laws will attract firms
and that states with anti-business laws will repel them. 74 As discussed above,
firms tied to particular states will tend to seek legal advice from lawyers who are
licensed in those states. Thus, the advantage a law license confers in
representing clients based in the licensing state depends on the attractiveness of
that state's law. This gives lawyers an incentive to participate in lawmaking in
the states in which they are licensed.
C. A DirectIntellectualPropertyApproach
This Article characterizes lawyer licensing as a method of creating
intellectual property rights in law. This raises the question whether a more direct
approach of explicitly creating such property rights might be preferable.' 75
Under such a direct approach, lawmakers would be given property rights in
specific laws. This would eliminate the need to license lawyers in order to
accomplish this result, with all of the market distortions licensing entails. The
property rights might be given to the state itself, which could then license or hire
law drafters, or to specific law writers, who could sell their creations to the state.
The legal problem with such property rights is that public law may not be
entitled to federal copyright protection on the ground that the public is entitled
to unimpeded access to law. 76 Although one may write a model code that is

of localizing jurisdiction.
173. See generally Asahi Metal Industry Co. v Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102

(1987); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Int'l Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
174. For discussions of this point in the context of pressures leading states toward
efficiency, see Kobayashi &Ribstein, Contract,supranote 5,and Ribstein & Kobayashi,
StateRegulation, supranote 5. Note that the discussion inthe text implies that there may
be a tension between efficient choice of law rules and efficient lawyer licensing rules
since, apart from lawyer licensing, there are strong arguments for enforcing contractual
choice of law even without establishing a particular relationship with the chosen state.
See generally Ribstein, Choosing,supra note 5.

175. For discussion of various ideas along these lines, see Michael Abramowicz,
Speeding up the Crawl to the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 139 (2003).

176. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, 293 F.3d 791, 798-800 (5th Cir.
2002) (denying protection to building code adopted into law in violation of license); Irina
Y. Dmitrieva, State Ownership of Copyrights in PrimaryLaw Materials,23
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 81 (2000).

HASTINGS
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protected under copyright
law, the author lacks copyright protection in enacted
17 7
law based on the code.
Private lawmaking thus provides a way to encourage lawmaking efforts in
the absence of formal property rights. Various groups contractually create the
rules by which they are governed.1 7 1 Private parties can create rules for such
groups and obtain copyright protection for the rules without running afoul of the
public access concerns that apply to public law.
Strong legal rights might be
79
regimes.
legal
among
competition
by
replaced
Private lawmaking cannot, however, completely replace public law. Rather,
it exists only in certain circumstances in which private groups can internalize
lawmaking costs. The rest of society's legal needs must be satisfied by
government-supplied laws, as to which the need for public access is likely to
continue to preclude creation of intellectual property rights. In this setting, state
licensing of lawyers may be the best way to encourage lawmaking efforts.

177. See Veeck, 293 F.3d at 800. But see Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med.
Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that codes that identified medical
procedures produced by the American Medical Association had intellectual property
protection despite adoption by a federal agency). A possible compromise that
accommodates public access would be to grant a broad fair use privilege but protect laws
from copying by commercial interests or other jurisdictions that seek to use the laws to
encourage use of their courts and lawyers. Due process concerns are satisfied by giving
those who choose to be subject to the innovating state's law full access to that law.
178. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992)
(describing private remedies in a merchant's association); Gillian K. Hadfield,
PrivatizingCommercial Law: Lessonsfrom the Middle and the DigitalAges, Stanford
Law School, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 195
(March 2000), availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=220252
(discussing private merchants' remedies); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and
Borders-The Rise ofLaw in Cyberspace,48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1380, 1383, 1390-91
(1996) (discussing private remedies as a way of resolving Internet disputes); David V.
Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371 (2003) (discussing broad range of
private lawmaking and comparisons with public lawmaking).
179. These alternatives to law might also address the standard public interest
arguments for lawyer licensing by eliminating the need to rely on legal experts. See
Hadfield, supra note 69 (discussing problems in connection with law's excessive
complexity). There are, however, important benefits to formal law, including a
developed network of case law and forms, and the ability to offer a coherent set of
complex terms. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory Forms for Closely Held
Firms: Theories and Evidencefrom LLCs, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 369 (1995). Even without
such law, alternative dispute resolution systems might call for participation of lawyers
or those with skills comparable to lawyers, and therefore might raise policy issues similar
to those relating to professional licensing.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/1
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EI.

THE STATE COMPETITION DEBATE

Lawyers' role in lawmaking is most significant in the context of the state
competition debate. Although this debate has centered on corporate law, and
specifically the success of Delaware corporate law, it raises issues that relate
broadly to state law. This Part shows that many of the arguments commentators
have made for the proposition that state competition leads to inefficient outcomes
do not fully take account of lawyers' role in this competition. Subpart A
discusses commentators' arguments for imperfections in jurisdictional
competition, focusing on corporate law. Subpart B discusses the likely impact
of lawyers and lawyer licensing on the efficiency of state law.
A. The Efficiency of JurisdictionalCompetition
State law can be viewed as a kind of "product" that state legislatures
manufacture and that competes in a market for laws.'
Analogously to other
product markets, there are potential benefits from competing state laws as
compared with uniform state laws or federal laws. This is especially clear
regarding corporate law, where firms' ability freely to choose the applicable state
law by selecting the state of organization seems to encourage competition.
The debate concerns whether state competition is likely to lead to efficient
outcomes. State competition may not operate efficiently where litigants cannot
easily exit a particular state's law, as where they are sued in a court that applies
unfavorable local law.
State competition regarding corporate law is particularly controversial.
Some commentators argue that the corporate law competition is a "race to the
bottom" because managers disregard shareholder interests in choosing the
incorporation state. 8' Others argue that corporate law is a "race to the top"
because capital markets discipline managers' jurisdictional choice," 2 and there

180. See Romano, Law as a Product,supra note 6.
181. See William L. Cary, Federalism and CorporateLaw: Reflections upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). For more recent commentary consistent with this
view, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalismand CorporateLaw: The
Race to ProtectManagersfrom Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168 (1999), and Lucian
Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in CorporateLaw, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992).
182. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, ShareholderProtection,andthe Theory
ofthe Corporation,6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). For other commentary consistent with
this view, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC

STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991), Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom"
Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware'sCorporationLaw, 76 Nw.
U. L. REv. 913 (1982), and Romano, Law as a Product,supra note 6.
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is evidence supporting this view." 3 Specifically, Delaware has been said to have
won the competition by offering advantages other states cannot readily duplicate,
including a sophisticated bar and judiciary, well-developed case law, a
convenient location and ability to credibly commit to continuing to supply highquality law." 4
More recent theories of state law inefficiency attempt to show how, despite
market competition and efficient pricing of state laws in capital markets, a state
such as Delaware can retain its dominance in corporate law while preventing the
emergence of the optimal legal rules that would prevail in a perfectly competitive
market. These theories do not, like the "race to the bottom" theory, assert that
the winner of the state competition is the worst law, but only that the winner is
not as efficient as the law that would emerge under better competitive conditions.
These theories come in several varieties, some of which focus on the
demand for law, while others focus on the supply. First, it has been argued that
other states cannot readily duplicate Delaware's "network" advantages, thereby
"locking in" Delaware law as against the emergence of more efficient legal
standards.' This "network externalities" theory is based on the idea that buyers

183. See Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters:
"Unhealthy Competition" Versus FederalRegulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980); Roberta
Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 387, 495-97 (2001) (reviewing eight studies finding
positive abnormal stock returns from changing incorporation state); Romano, Law as a
Product,supra note 6. This evidence has been challenged, primarily on the ground that
it does not take adequate account of the fact that reincorporations are not random events,
so that their effects may be determined by the characteristics of particular corporations
and transactions. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence FavorState Competition
in CorporateLaw?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1784-85 (2002). There is also evidence that
Delaware firms had higher Tobin's Q's than non-Delaware firms in a study covering the
period 1981-1996. See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62
J. FIN. ECON. 559 (2001). This is obviously significant given Delaware's victory in the
charter competition. However, a later recent study casts doubt on the extent and
implications of this "Delaware effect." See Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing
Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming 2004) (finding that the effect
disappears during the post 1996 period, possibly because of changes in Delaware
takeover law and in managerial compensation that offset any Delaware law takeover law
advantage).
184. See Romano, Law as a Product, supra note 6.
185. See Klausner, supra note 145. For other discussions of the network
externalities and related theories in the context of business associations, see Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and
Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999), Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds:
Bondholder Protection or Management
Entrenchment?,40 UCLA L. REV. 931 (1993), Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path
Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and
Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347 (1996), Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/1
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or users add value to a product.'86 In the case of business associations, as more
firms join the network of users, more cases are decided interpreting ambiguous
terms in similar contracts, common practices such as investment banker fairness
opinions emerge, legal services become standardized and therefore less costly,
and books and continuing legal education materials explain contractual terms,
all reducing errors of ambiguity, inconsistency and incompleteness in contract
terms.' 7 Also, widespread use of corporate terms helps capital markets value
corporate terms. These benefits might be viewed as "externalities" because new
users do not consider benefits they would confer on other users when adopting
the product or standard. Thus, firms may continue to use Delaware law even if
this law is less efficient than that of other states because the firms do not
internalize the network benefits from adopting that other law. States may
concede the most lucrative portion of the market to Delaware and follow a
relatively passive strategy of adopting the Model Business Corporation Act,
which provides sophisticated drafting and a network of case law that enables
states other than Delaware to retain the incorporation business of small and
medium-sized firms. Variations on this network externalities theory are that
Delaware's legal indeterminacy enables it to increase network effects and
thereby to hold onto its dominant position, 8' and that it uses its market power to

Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of
Boilerplate'), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997), Brett H. McDonnell, Getting Stuck Between
Bottom and Top: State Competition for Corporate Charters in the Presence ofNetwork
Effects, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 681 (2003), and Tara J. Wortman, Note, Unlocking Lock-In:
Limited Liability Companies and the Key to Underutilization of Close Corporation
Statutes, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1362 (1995). For criticisms of this application of network
externalities theory, see Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-in Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U.
L. REV. 813 (1998), Mark A. Lemley &David McGowan, Legal Implications ofNetwork
Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 562-86 (1998), and Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce
H. Kobayashi, Choice ofForm and Network Externalities, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79
(2001) (presenting evidence contrary to the operation of network externalities in the

development of business associations laws).
186. See Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of Q WERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV.
332 (1985). For criticisms of the network externalities theory, see S. J. Liebowitz &
Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1990), and S. J.
Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J.
ECON. PERSP. 133 (1994).

187. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L.

REV. 261, 286-89 (1985) (discussing the role of these errors in the tradeoffs between
express and implied terms).
188. See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in
Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998).
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charge firms franchise taxes and litigation costs according to the benefits firms
gain from using Delaware's law."8 9
A second "demand-side" explanation of state law inefficiency is that,
because managers rather than shareholders initiate re-incorporations, state
competition may not weed out laws that favor managers. 9 " This argument
resembles the traditional "race to the bottom" story, except that the argument is
that Delaware wins not because it is the worst but rather because it is the least
bad. Specifically, Delaware may compete to provide the best law in some
respects, but not for provisions such as anti-takeover rules that attract
management-initiated re-incorporations by redistributing corporate wealth from
shareholders to managers. This theory attempts to reconcile its inefficiency story
with evidence of positive stock price effects from re-incorporations.' 9' There is
also evidence that frmns are attracted to or do not avoid states other than
Delaware that have apparently pro-management provisions. 9 ' Although the
agency problem on which this theory is based is specific to business associations,
it is analogous to any contractual relationship in which one party seems to have
leverage in choosing the applicable law, including franchiser and franchisee, and
lender and borrower.
A third type of state law inefficiency theory focuses on parties' incentives
to supply law rather than on the demand for such law. Legislators seemingly do
not gain enough from making their state's law competitive to justify engaging
proactively in law reform,'93 particularly since other jurisdictions can copy
successful innovations.' 94 Although the state's residents may gain from the
state's being a leader in the competition, their gains probably are not large
enough to overcome the significant costs they would incur in organizing to
secure such gains. ' Accordingly, they may prefer simply to exit to a state with
better law. This is particularly the case for state competition outside of Delaware

189. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discriminationin the Market for
CorporateLaw, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205 (2001).
190. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable
Limits on State Competition in CorporateLaw, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992).
191. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
192. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in
CorporateLaw?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775 (2002).
193. See Douglas J. Cumming & Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, The Role of
InterjurisdictionalCompetition in Shaping Canadian CorporateLaw, 20 INT'L REV. L.
& ECON. 141, 144-46 (2000).
194. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism
Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980).

195. By contrast, particular taxpayer groups maybe able effectively to organize to
oppose state regulation that drives industry away. See Kobayashi & Ribstein, Contract,
supra note 5.
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and not involving publicly held corporations, where incentives to compete for
franchise fees are less obvious. 96
It is unclear that state competition is flawed for any of the reasons discussed
' For example, with respect to the argument that Delaware corporate law
above. 97
is entrenched against competition even from more efficient state laws, there is
evidence that states other than Delaware respond defensively to changes in
Delaware law, that these responses are positively related to franchise revenue,
and that nationwide competition for corporate law is reflected in the interstate
pattern of adoptions of corporate statutory innovations19 and revisions to the
Model Business Corporation Act. 9 9 Moreover, there is a basic theoretical
question why contracts and markets cannot deal with the problem. For example,
the parties in the corporate setting could contract to permit shareholders rather
than managers to initiate a re-incorporation. 00 The evidence that corporations
tend to gravitate toward anti-takeover states2 ' does not necessarily establish the
inefficiency of state competition. Instead, in the absence of direct evidence of
inefficient competition, firrms' choice of these states could indicate that the
suspect provisions, or the overall statutes in which they are included, are wealthmaximizing. The main importance of this evidence therefore may be to show
that states other than Delaware arecompeting in the charter market both to retain
and proactively to capture incorporations.
The state competition debate has focused on publicly held corporations.
Competition might differ in the market for unincorporated firms on the theory
that Delaware does not dominate this market to the same extent as it does the
market for publicly held firms.20 2 Smaller firms' costs of operating outside the
196. See supra text accompanying note 6 (discussing Delaware's franchise fee
incentive).
197. For an exhaustive rebuttal to arguments concerning imperfections in state
corporate law competition, see Romano, supranote 183.
198. See id.
199. See William J.Carney, The ProductionofCorporateLaw, 71 S. CAL. L. REV.

715 (1998).
200. It has been argued that firms should be permitted to opt into a federal takeover
regime, and required to allow shareholders rather than managers to exercise the opt-in
right. See Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 181. This proposal assumes that federal
lawmakers have incentives to adopt socially optimal laws that state lawmakers lack. The
proposed mandatory opt-in procedure lets shareholders avoid managers' exclusive right
to initiate re-incorporations. For criticism of this proposal, see Stephen J. Choi &
Andrew T. Guzman, ChoiceandFederalIntervention in CorporateLaw, 87 VA. L. REV.
961 (2001). For a rebuttal, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federal
Intervention to Enhance ShareholderChoice, 87 VA. L. REV. 993 (2001).
201. See Bebchuk, supranote 190.
202. Note that Delaware is second only to California in LLC formations. See
Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 185 (presenting state-by-state data on organization of
unincorporated firms). This indicates that Delaware may be competing for
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formation state and paying foreign corporation fees may be high relative to total
capitalization."0 3 Also, the lower fees these firms generate would seem to
translate into weaker state incentives to compete. On the other hand, these firms
also are more mobile than corporations in terms of the low decision-making costs
of changing their state of organization in response to inefficient legal rules.
There is evidence of welfare-enhancing competition regarding the law of closely
held firms.2 '
State competition for corporate law, as well as for other law, may work
better than inefficiency theories would predict because these theories overlook
lawyers' role in promoting state competition."' For reasons discussed above in
this Subpart and more fully below,0 6 lawyers can internalize the benefits of
creating new networks of legal materials and of innovations even if new
members of the network and legislators cannot. This responds to the "supplyside" problems discussed above.20 7 Lawyers' interests in efficient law, discussed
in the next Subpart, also may offset the power of other groups, such as managers,
who pay less attention to overall efficiency."" Lawyers'role in state competition
may explain data showing that states other than Delaware retain a significant
percentage of companies located in the state, and even proactively compete for
some out-of-state incorporation business, despite the lack of a Delaware-type
franchise fee incentive. 9 This data is consistent with lawyers' efforts to make

unincorporated firms just as it does for corporations.
203. See Bebchuk, supra note 190 (showing evidence that larger firms are more
likely than smaller firms to incorporate outside home state); Roberta Romano, State
Competitionfor Close CorporationCharters: A Commentary, 70 WAsH. U. L.Q. 409,
413 (1992) (arguing that there is relatively little competition for such firms because the
transaction cost benefits of closely held firm statutes are relatively low).
204. See Ribstein, supra note 179, at 392-94; see also Goforth, supra note 136
(showing evidence of competition regarding LLC laws); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E.
Ribstein, Evolution and Spontaneous Uniformity: Evidencefrom the Evolution of the
Limited Liability Company, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 464 (1996) (showing evidence of
evolution of state statutes toward efficient level of uniformity).
205. For an examination of lawyers' role in non-corporate state competition, see
Ribstein, supra note 7.
206. See infra text accompanying note 220.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 193-200. Lawyers' incentives in this
regard would seem to be stronger than those of Congress to legislate regarding takeovers,
the approach suggested by Bebchuk & Ferrell, supranote 200, at 1002. This conclusion
is supported by Congress's spotty record regarding takeover legislation. See Romano,
supra note 183, at 537-38.
208. See infra text accompanying note 231.
209. See Bebchuk, supra note 190. Bebchuk argues that states lack incentives to
promulgate optimal law. Even if that is the case, the point in the text is the more limited
one that state competition may be more efficient given lawyer licensing than it would be
in the absence of such licensing.
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their state's corporation law a viable choice. Also, firms may choose to locate
and incorporate in particular states in order to maximize the chance that courts
will apply that state's non-corporate law."' This, in turn, may be attributable to
lawyers' efforts to maintain the law of the states in which they are licensed, as
explained more fully below."'
B. Effect of Lawyers' Influence
This Subpart considers the question whether lawyers' participation in
lawmaking is likely to result in laws that are more, or less, efficient than would
be the case with less lawyer involvement. It shows that lawyers' effects on state
law depend on the incentives of both lawyers and of contracting parties. Even
if lawyers want to use the law to extract benefits from clients, state competition
may constrain them from doing so.
In evaluating lawyers' incentives, it is important to consider the alternatives
and to avoid the Nirvana fallacy. If lawyers do not exercise influence, other
interest groups may take their place. These groups may be more likely than
'
Also, lawyers' incentives
lawyers to promote inefficient wealth transfers. 12
might differ in the absence of state licensing." 3 Accordingly, enhancing
lawyers' incentives to participate in state lawmaking might lead to more efficient
laws than if lawyers do not have these incentives. Thus, even if lawyers can
extract private gains from their state's laws, society still might be better off than
if lawyers had less influence.
Sections 1 and 2 discuss the costs and benefits of lawyers' participation in
lawmaking. Section 3 summarizes the general factors concerning state
lawmaking and competition that help determine whether lawyers will make state
law more, or less, efficient.
1. Benefits of Lawyer Participation
Lawyers may play a beneficial role in state competition by solving "supplyside" problems that critics of state law have discussed." 4 First, lawyers may
have an incentive that legislators lack to update their state's law in order to

210. See supra notes 5, 170-71 and accompanying text; infra note 238 and
accompanying text.
211. See infra Part II.B.
212. An example is the effect of non-lawyer interest groups in diluting statutory
enforcement of contractual choice of law in states other than Delaware. See infra text
accompanying note 252.
213. See supranote 101 (noting the role of the national bankruptcy bar in lobbying
for bankruptcy law as an indication of lawyers' incentives under federal licensing).
214. See supra text accompanying note 205.
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attract clients from and avoid losing clients to lawyers in competing states.
Lawyers can enhance their reputations by participating in state lawmaking.
Indeed, other states' copying of lawyer-sponsored innovations may bring lawyers
more public recognition, 1 5 in contrast to the potential erosion of benefits to
originating states or legislators resulting from this spread. 216 Lawyers' gains,
unlike those of legislators, do not depend on an interest group's being able to
overcome organizational costs to lobby them. Moreover, unlike legislators,
lawyers' gains are not offset by any potential loss of support of competing
interest groups.
Second, lawyers may have incentives to resist changes in their state laws
that cause one-time wealth-transfers, even if these transfers generate short-term
increases in legal business.1 7 Lawyers would hesitate to hurt their state's
reputation as a favorable place to do business by sponsoring wealth-transferring
law changes. This theory most clearly applies to Delaware corporate law where
circumstances such as the small size of the state and its reliance on franchise
taxes enable Delaware to post a kind of "bond" securing the maintenance of
efficient corporate law. 21 8 But other states also have incentives to establish
themselves as magnets for commercial transactions and litigation. This may
affect the law of a commercial center like New York, which contracting parties
frequently designate as the governing law.219
Third, lawyers can earn royalties, attract clients, and increase their
reputations by supplying ancillary legal materials that increase the benefits of
using a state's law. These include continuing legal education lectures and
materials, treatises, legal forms, and law review articles. Since lawyers gain
reputation and other benefits from producing these materials regardless of how
many clients use their state's law, lawyers can help overcome supposed network
externalities problems inherent in business association law.220
Fourth, lawyers may provide expertise that attracts clients to the state and
its laws. For example, the state's lawyers might commit substantial resources to
specializing in representing particular types of clients, such as high-tech
companies. This commitment may, in effect, bond the bar to maintain the law
relating to the needs of those industries.

215. Lawyers' reputations may be harmed by working on ill-conceived innovations.
But this risk may do no more than offset lawyers' incentives to promote excessive
innovation in order to generate additional legal fees.
216. See supra text accompanying note 194.
217. See Larry E. Ribstein, ChangingStatutory Forms, I J. SMALL & EMERGING
Bus. L. 11 (1997) (discussing the tradeoff between change and stability).
218. See Romano, Law as a Product,supra note 6.
219. See Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics,supranote 5, at 433 n.301 (showing
data indicating New York's prominence as a state that is contractually selected to supply
the applicable law).
220. See supra text accompanying note 185.
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2. Costs of Lawyer Participation
Lawyers' participation in lawmaking will not necessarily lead to more
efficient laws because lawyers have incentives to seek legal rules that
" ' Thus, it has been argued that
inefficiently increase the demand for lawyers. 22
22
Delaware lawyers seek to make Delaware law excessively lawyer-friendly.
Lawyers use their influence to adversely affect the law in several ways.
First, lawyers may seek rules that increase the need for and cost of litigation,22 3
including fact-intensive standards that judges must apply in specific cases.224
Second, lawyers may advocate rules that increase the cost of or need for
legal advice. 25 Most directly, lawyers may favor unauthorized practice laws
requiring the use of lawyers for tasks that may not require extensive legal
training, such as no-fault divorces and real estate work.226 Also, laws that render
certain types of agreements or terms unenforceable or impose formalities as a
condition of enforceability may deter business people from writing agreements
without legal assistance.
Third, lawyers may benefit from frequent changes in laws that force parties
to seek legal advice in connection with rewriting their agreements to conform to
the new law.227
Fourth, lawyers may seek to sponsor inefficient laws in order to attract
litigants to the courts in which they are licensed. Lawyers thereby may be

221. See, e.g., Rubin & Bailey, supranote 140. Since licensing laws constrain the
supply of lawyers, see supra Part I.B.2, increasing the demand for legal services would
increase lawyers' income, other things being equal.
222. See Macey & Miller, supra note 135.
223. See Fischel, supranote 109, at 969 n.57; Macey & Miller, supra note 135, at
504.
224. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 189 (noting these and other factors that
increase Delaware corporate litigation).
225. It has been argued that government-supplied law is inherently complex and
costly, and arguably disadvantages low-income clients with small transactions. See
Hadfield, supra note 69. The point is that, even given a particular amount of
government-supplied law, increasing lawyers' role might cause law to be more complex
and costly than it otherwise would be.
226. See supra Part I.C. These laws, in turn, may be opposed by powerful nonlawyer groups that also seek this business. See Lueck et al., supra note 57, at 80. For a
discussion of the appropriate scope of unauthorized practice laws under the lawyers-aslawmakers model, see infra Part IV.B.
227. See Ribstein, supra note 217 (discussing the need to balance the benefits of
legal evolution against the costs of change). However, these incentives are
counterbalanced by other incentives that favor stability. Lawyers may want to ensure the
stability of their state's law in order to attract clients. See supra text accompanying note
217. They may also be concerned about the increasing risk of malpractice liability for
not keeping abreast of changing law.
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serving their states' as well as their own interests even if they are reducing
overall social welfare. By contrast, in the three situations discussed above,
lawyers may be serving their own interests at the expense not only of social
welfare, but also of their own states to the extent that pro-lawyer rules make the
states less desirable places to live and do business. Lawyers' objective in
advocating such rules is to extract enough gains from those who remain to
compensate for the loss of business from those who leave.
Lawyers' direct influence on legal rules differs from their influence as
clients' agents. Lawyers may, for example, exploit their relationships with
corporate managers to encourage firms to incorporate in states where lawyers are
licensed or that are otherwise favorable to the lawyers whether or not they serve
the interests of firms or their managers."2 ' But it does not necessarily follow that
lawyers perversely influence state law in their role as lawmakers. Instead,
lawyers may try to improve their states' laws when they cannot easily induce
firms to make bad choices.
In any event, the theory that lawyers act as perverse agents in the
incorporation decision is questionable for several reasons. First, incorporation
choices are reviewed by in-house counsel whose interests are strongly aligned
with those of their firms. Second, lawyers in multi-state law firms may not care
in which of the states a client chooses to incorporate, at least to the extent that
the lawyers' and law firms' interests are aligned.229 These law firms, in turn,
handle many of the large transactions in which firms contractually designate the
applicable state law.23 Third, any lawyer self-interest in promoting choice of
law may simply offset the self-interest of other corporate agents. For example,
corporate lawyers may favor takeovers that would leave them representing the
acquired company, thereby balancing managers' interests in anti-takeover
laws.23'

228. See Bebchuk, supranote 192, at 1790-9 1; cf. John C. Coates IV, Explaining
Variation in Takeover Defenses, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1301 (2001) (showing that the identity
and location of law firms representing companies affect the anti-takeover charter
provisions these companies choose in going public).
229. The individual lawyer may care to the extent that a client's incorporation
decision determines which of the firm's offices will service the client. But, for example,
a lawyer in the non-Delaware office of a multi-state firm may lose less from the client's
decision to incorporate in Delaware, where the firm also has an office, than would a
lawyer based outside of Delaware in a firm that does not have a Delaware office. Similar
considerations apply to advising clients on the contractual choice of non-corporate law.
230. See infra text accompanying note 241.
231. See Romano, supranote 183, at 534.
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3. The Effect of Jurisdictional Competition and Type of Practice
Jurisdictional competition determines whether lawyers can benefit from
promoting inefficient laws without causing clients to seek coverage of less
lawyer-friendly law or extralegal dispute resolution.232 Whether law is
excessively lawyer-friendly therefore depends on whether it is insulated from the
effects of state competition.
Lawyers' ability to attract litigation business to their home jurisdictions
through their lawmaking efforts depends significantly on the rules for
determining the applicable law. Parties' ability to effectively contract for the
applicable law and forum is likely to maximize the joint welfare of contracting
parties. 233 Even in consumer settings, where selling firms may seem to have an
advantage over buyers, markets arguably constrain firms from using one-sided
choice of law and choice of forum clauses. 3 It follows that, to the extent such
legal rules apply, lawyers could attract litigants to their forum only by drafting
and promoting efficient laws rather than those that favor any particular party or
group. On the other hand, to the extent that plaintiffs can decide where to sue
at the time of litigation and the courts do not enforce choice of law and choice
of forum clauses, as in many tort cases, lawyers have an incentive to secure
plaintiff-friendly laws to maximize litigation in their jurisdictions. These laws
are often inefficient because they take account only of the interests of one party
to the suit.
These general observations suggest that the following factors, among
others, determine whether lawyers will have incentives to advocate efficient
laws:

232. See id.at 525-26 (noting that "Delaware's commanding position in the charter
market no doubt may enable the corporate bar to siphon off a share of Delaware's rents
by fashioning a legal regime that increases its income at the expense of share value. But
the trade-off will not reach the point at which a firm will be indifferent to staying in
Delaware or changing domicile."). Romano also notes, id. at 526, that lawyers do not
gain abnormal returns because of competition in the market for legal services, citing
Rosen, supra note 52, consistent with data showing that lawyers' income is attributable
to the value of their human capital. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. However,

Delaware lawyers might gain from adoption of pro-lawyer rules because licensing laws
constrain competition to provide the additional services these rules require.
233. See O'Hara & Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency, supra note 5. The
effectiveness of the choice of law clause can be enhanced by a choice of forum clause
because courts are likely to apply local law. See Kobayashi & Ribstein, Contract,supra

note 5.
234. See Kobayshi & Ribstein, Contract,supranote 5; O'Hara and Ribstein, From
Politics to Efficiency, supra note 5; Ribstein, Choosing,supra note 5.
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1. Lawyers' gains from enacting lawyer-friendly rules may depend on
whether the rule enables the lawyer to extract significant profits from
each client that outweigh losses caused by clients leaving the lawyers'
jurisdiction to avoid the rule. Thus, litigation-promoting rules may
help trial lawyers but hurt transactional lawyers.
2. Tort litigators may have an incentive to favor inefficient proplaintiff tort laws in their home jurisdictions because defendants
cannot easily avoid being sued in pro-plaintiff states.235
3. Trial lawyers who specialize in contract disputes have an incentive
to favor efficient laws in their home jurisdictions because, to the extent
that courts enforce contractual choice of law, they can increase local
litigation only if the parties agree in advance of a dispute to be
governed by local law and to have the dispute decided in the local
court.
4. Transactional lawyers have an incentive to increase the efficiency
of their state's law in order to encourage potential clients to locate in
their states. Location in a state exposes a fnm to the jurisdiction of
local courts, which in turn are likely to apply local law,236 and makes
application of that state's law more likely even in other states' courts
under conflict of laws rules.237 Even incorporating in a jurisdiction
may enhance the likelihood that courts will enforce the choice of the
law of that jurisdiction.238 Although firms that benefit from wealth
transfers might gain from locating in a state with inefficient laws, this
effect is likely to be offset by causing wealth-transferors to avoid the
state. Moreover, since finms cannot easily determine the effects of
many commercial and business laws at the time of making their
location decisions, they would tend to locate in states based on the
state's reputation for overall efficiency and stability of their laws rather
than on the wealth-transferring effects of specific laws.
5. Lawyers specializing in some types of law practice may have
incentives to promote inefficient laws in their home states. For

235. Tort defense lawyers might also gain from more litigation rather than from
defendant-favoring laws. Thus, their incentives may be similar to those of plaintiffs'
lawyers, although they may be less tied to a particular jurisdiction.
236. See supranote 166 and accompanying text. For discussions of the effect of
location decisions as an offset to plaintiff forum-shopping, see Kobayashi & Ribstein,
Contract,supranote 5, and Ribstein & Kobayashi, State Regulation,supra note 5.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 170-71.
238. For cases holding that the place of incorporation was a significant factor in
enforcing contractual choice of law, see Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Ct., 834 P.2d
1148, 1153 (Cal. 1992), Guardian Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. MD Assocs., 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151,
156 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998), and Al Baraka Bancorp (Chicago), Inc. v. Hilweh, 656 A.2d 197,
200 (Vt. 1994). But see Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941,948-49 (7th Cir. 1994).
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example, divorce lawyers may have an incentive to lobby for laws that
force people to use lawyers in divorces because this may be the only
way the lawyers can retain business, even if some people leave the
jurisdiction to get cheaper divorces.239

6. Large law firms' incentives regarding state law may differ from
those of smaller firms. Large firms' clients are likely to be relatively
large companies that need the sort of diverse services only large law
firms can provide.24 These clients, in turn, are relatively likely to
" ' and to consider the choice
employ contractual choice of law clauses24
of law ramifications of location decisions. Thus, lawyers in large law
firms have an incentive to make their state's law attractive to parties
that choose law by contract, rather than ex post at the time of
litigation.242 By contrast, smaller firms' clients are more likely to be
local and not particularly sensitive to choice of law, or tort plaintiffs
who seek advantage from choosing the law and forum at the time of
suit.
The efficiency of lawyers' involvement in lawmaking may not, however,
depend as much on the nature of their practice as the above categories suggest.
Lawyers' political influence depends on their ability to subordinate their
individual interests to those of lawyers as a whole. Thus, lawyer lobbying may
depend on the overall balance of lawyers' interests rather than reflecting the
differing interests of various subgroups of lawyers. Moreover, since lawyers
share earnings through firms, lawyers in firms that engage in a range of
transactional and litigation work have an incentive to promote the overall
efficiency of state law rather than the interests of any department of the firm. 2 4 3

In short, transactional lawyers' overall interest in efficient laws may determine
lawyers' lobbying goals.
On the other hand, lawyers' overall interest may be in reducing competition
among legal systems and increasing uniformity and harmonization of law. This
may explain lawyers' support for uniform laws in the U.S. and the opposition of

239. See supra Part I.E.3; infra Part IV.B (discussing unauthorized practice laws).
240. See Ribstein, supra note 19, at 1716.
241. See Ribstein, Choosing,supra note 5, at 288 (noting that, since choice of law
clauses generally are included in elaborate form contracts, they are cost-justified mainly
if used on a large scale by big national firms).
242. Lawyers in multi-state law firms also mayhave less parochial incentives when
advising clients in that they have less of an interest in their clients' choosing the law of
a particular state, at least to the extent that the interests of the individual lawyers in the
firm are aligned with those of the firm. See supra text accompanying note 228.
243. This suggests that a move toward larger law firms may have implications for
the efficiency of state law.
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many lawyers to Delaware-type jurisdictional competition in Europe. 2" To the
extent that lawyers' gain from the types of inefficient rules discussed in Section
2 is constrained by jurisdictional competition, lawyers may use their political
power to restrict jurisdictional competition and thereby to loosen market
constraints on their self-interested conduct.
Lawyers' incentives regarding jurisdictional competition may depend on the
extent to which they stand to gain clients from more competition even as
competition limits lawyers' ability to extract gains from each client. Lawyers
may gain if the states in which they practice are net winners in interstate
competition. Lawyers' choice of states in which to practice may depend on
where they need to live. Also, licensing laws themselves constrain lawyer
mobility.24 Lawyers who must or want to live in states that could be expected
to lose from free competition might favor uniform laws.
4. Type of Law
The efficiency of lawyers' influence on law may vary not only from one
type of lawyer or firm to another but also from one type of law to another. This
may have significant policy implications for lawyer licensing. For example,
because firms in effect contract for the application of business association
statutes in advance of any dispute, the analysis in Section 3 predicts that lawyers'
involvement in this type of lawmaking will produce more efficient laws. Prior
studies have examined state-by-state adoption of corporate innovations in the
Model Business Corporation Act" and of limited liability company statutes.2 47
LLC statutes remove barriers to limited liability that add planning and litigation
costs with little corresponding benefit.2 4' There is, in fact, significant evidence
that lawyers pushed for changes in and adoption of the statutes.249 This provides
at least anecdotal support for the efficiency of lawyers' lawmaking efforts.

244. The implications of this Article's analysis for other federal systems, including
Europe, are discussed infra Part III.C.
245. See supra Part I.B.2.
246. See Camey, supra note 199.
247. See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Uniform Laws, Model Laws and
Limited Liability Companies, 66 COLO. L. REv. 947 (1995).
248. See Ribstein, supra note 179; Larry E. Ribstein, The DeregulationofLimited
Liability and the Death ofPartnership, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (1992).
249. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. It would be interesting to see if
states where lawyers have the most influence in lawmaking are those that reacted most
quickly to this development. Note that lawyers may have pushed for these laws not
simply to help their clients or improve the law, but also for the more selfish benefit of
widening the scope of limited liability for their own firms. See supra note 137. This may
imply that lawyers would not be so proactive with respect to laws that did not affect
lawyers in this way.
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Another example of efficient lawmaking is statutes providing for
enforcement of contractual choice of law clauses.2 5 0 These statutes arguably are
efficient because they enhance parties' ability to select the law when transacting
rather than when litigating, thereby helping to ensure that the applicable law will
maximize the welfare of all contracting parties.25' Comparing the versions of
these statutes adopted in Delaware, where lawyers seem to have significant
influence,25 2 with those adopted in states where lawyers are less influential,
provides some anecdotal evidence of the efficiency of lawyers' role in state
lawmaking.
Conversely, lawyers' impact on the efficiency of state law may appear from
a positive or negative correlation between states' adoptions of inefficient statutes
and lawyers' power in each state. For example, there is evidence that statutes
that impose constraints on franchise contracts reduce social welfare.2 "
Transactional lawyers could be expected to oppose these statutes because they
deter potential franchiser clients from locating in enacting states.254 This
suggests that a state's failure to adopt such a statute might be partly attributable
to lawyers' opposition. More directly, it may be possible to measure lawyers'
impact by examining states' overall regulatory environments.
Differences among types of laws might appear not only in states' tendency
to enact them, but also in their tendency to enact uniform versions of the laws.
A state's willingness to adopt a uniform law proposal may reflect the state's
lawyers' reluctance to invest in customized drafting or their inability to promote
a customized law. This, in turn, may be attributable to the lawyers' lack of
political power or incentives to invest in lawmaking. On the other hand, a state's
tendency to adopt uniform law proposals may not clearly test the efficiency of
lawyers' involvement because uniformity is efficient in some circumstances and
inefficient in others. In particular, the benefits of unifornity are relatively low
for laws relating to long-term contracts because parties can solve most problems
of state-to-state variation by contracting for the application of a particular law.
Uniformity's benefits in this situation therefore probably do not outweigh its
costs in terms of reduced variation and competition. 25 5 Although states have
tended toward uniformity where it is efficient, they have not clearly avoided
uniformity as to rules for long-term-contracts where uniformity is least

250. See generally Ribstein, supra note 7 (discussing these statutes).
251. See supra text accompanying note 233.
252. See Macey & Miller, supra note 135.
253. See James A. Brickley et al., The Economic Effects ofFranchiseTermination
Laws, 34 J.L. &ECON. 101, 115-16 (1991); Richard L. Smith II, FranchiseRegulation:
An Economic Analysis ofState Restrictionson Automobile Distribution,25 J.L. & ECON.
125 (1982).
254. See Ribstein & Kobayashi, Contract,supra note 5.
255. See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of
Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (1996).
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efficient.256 The states that have moved toward inefficient uniformity may be
those in which lawyers are weakest.
States also vary widely in the extent to which they copy the uniform law
proposals promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. Some states adopt proposals in name, but only after
making significant variations. A state's enactment of a modified version of a
uniform law may indicate active lawyer involvement rather than passivity.
Moreover, a state's decision to modify a uniform provision may or may not be
efficient. For example, uniformity may be efficient in provisions concerning
third-party creditors, such as restrictions on dividends, because firms cannot
effectively contract for the application of a particular provision without their
creditors' consent. On the other hand, uniformity is less efficient with respect
to provisions applying solely between the firm's owners because customized
contracting is practicable in this context." 7 Variations in the degree of adoption
of a given proposal across the states might correlate with lawyers' role in
lawmaking, although many variables regarding different types of laws may be
significant.
The above discussion suggests that one can test the nature of lawyers'
influence on law by observing both the types of laws a jurisdiction enacts and
lawyers' power in that state. However, it may be difficult to determine the
precise extent of lawyers' political power. Neither the number of lawyers in a
state,25 nor the amount lawyers spend on lobbying,259 is likely accurately to
measure lawyers' power. Indeed, large relative numbers of lawyers might
negatively correlate with lawyers' political power because it indicates that the
lawyers have been unable effectively to control entry into the profession. More
promising tests, therefore, would reflect factors that relate to lawyers' political
coordination costs. For example, lawyers in a state dominated by a few large law
firms may be more politically powerful than in one consisting of many sole
practitioners or small firms. Also, the heterogeneity of law practice may be
important. A mix of tort, business and other types of lawyers may be less
effective in enacting a particular legislative program than a bar dominated by
corporate or tort lawyers. This could account for differences in the law between,
say, Delaware, where the corporate bar is strong, and Mississippi, where the tort
lawyers appear to be strong.

256. See id.
257. See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 204.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75 (discussing the role of coordination
costs).
259. See supra note 134 (noting the significance of lawyers' direct participation
in lobbying).
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C. Implicationsfor Federalism
This Article sheds possible light on the allocation of political power
between federal and state governments. Given a U.S.-style federal system,
licensing lawyers encourages their participation in state lawmaking by reducing
free-riding on their lawmaking efforts. This implies that, given lawyers and
lawyer licensing, a U.S.-style federal system, or allocating more power to the
states within such a system, may be more efficient than a unitary system or a
strong federal government.26 ° By analogy to this Article's argument for lawyer
licensing, the costs of impeding nation-wide competition by having fifty-one
legal systems may be outweighed by the incentives a federal system creates to
enact better laws.
A variation on this argument is that the quality of competition among the
states in a federal system may depend on lawyers' incentives to participate in
lawmaking. For example, lawyers may have less influence on lawmaking in
Europe than in the U.S. Also, significant legal, cultural and language differences
between regimes inherently limit lawyers' practice outside their home
jurisdictions. If European lawyers get little business from outside their home
countries, they may have an incentive to oppose all jurisdictional competition
and favor harmonization of laws rather than to accept competition and make their
jurisdictions more competitive.2"' Also, the advent of multinational law firms
may change European lawyers' incentives regarding jurisdictional competition
since law firms can compete for international business even if individual lawyers
262
cannot.

IV. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF LICENSING REQUIREMENTS
This Part discusses implications of the lawmaking-incentive theory for the
nature and scope of licensing requirements and for licensing of professions other
than law. Subpart A discusses how this Article's theory bears on what should

260. This is analogous to one commentator's argument that federalism promotes
social relationships that allow citizens to overcome collective action problems. See Jason
Mazzone, The Social CapitalArgumentfor Federalism, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 27
(2001).
261. The absence of a history of jurisdictional competition in Europe may have
affected the structure of legal institutions and lawyers' incentives. All this may change
in the wake of Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999
E.C.R. 1-1459, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 551 (1999), which applied the law ofthe incorporating
jurisdiction, and therefore introduces an important predicate of U.S.-stylejurisdictional
competition. For a discussion of implications of Centros for European business
association law, see Larry E. Ribstein, The Evolving Partnership,26 J. CORP. L. 819
(2001).
262. I am indebted to Klaus Heine for this point.
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be required in order to obtain a license. Subpart B deals with the definition of
law practice for purposes of determining what constitutes unauthorized practice
of law. Subpart C outlines an alternative approach to addressing the free-rider
problem-licensing specialists rather than, or in addition to, state-by-state.
Subpart D discusses the potential for state variation and competition in licensing
requirements. Subpart E discusses this Article's implications for state licensing
of professions other than law.
A. Licensing Requirements
The lawmaking-incentive argument for lawyer licensing may provide a
basis for determining the requirements for obtaining a law license. If licensing
is solely a way to ensure lawyer quality, it is not clear that three years of broad
law school training in law and policy, or even a college degree, should be
required for a license. Law schools do not teach the skills that are important to
representing many clients, 63 while teaching skills that are irrelevant to what most
lawyers do.
On the other hand, to the extent that licensing is justified as a way to
encourage lawyers to participate in lawmaking, lawyers should be broadly
trained in the legal system and public policy rather than just having the skills that
matter to the specific work they choose to do.2 " This responds to the argument
that law school accreditation requirements are excessively costly because they
over-train lawyers for some tasks.26
B. Defining Law Practice
Statutes enforce lawyer licensing requirements by imposing sanctions for
the unauthorized practice of law.266 The defimitions in the statutes and developed

263. See Leef, supra note 22, at 35.
264. At the same time, if law school teaches skills that do not matter to most
clients, this would suggest that law school should not be the exclusive requirement-that
is, that there should be no "diploma privilege." The bar exam may serve the purpose of
ensuring that lawyers have the requisite basic legal knowledge.
265. See Elson, supra note 62.
266. For a summary of these provisions as of 1999, see Center for Professional
Responsibility, American Bar Association, 1999 Survey ofUnauthorizedPracticeofLaw
Committees (1999), availableat http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/model def stat
utes.pdf. For analyses of the law and policy of unauthorized practice of law, see Anthony
Bertelli, Should Social Workers Engage in the UnauthorizedPracticeof Law?, 8 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 15 (1998), Barlow F. Christensen, The UnauthorizedPracticeof Law: Do
Good Fences Really Make Good Neighbors-OrEven Good Sense?, 2 AM. B. FOUND.
REs. J. 159 (1980), Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the UnauthorizedPracticeof
Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters,67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2581
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/1

58

Ribstein: Ribstein: Lawyers as Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing

2004]

LAWYERS AS LA WMAKERS

in the cases are open-ended and circular.267 In applying these definitions, courts
have considered what lawyers customarily do, what requires legal skill, and what
involves complexity.268 The courts have characterized as unauthorized practice
providing and filling in legal forms in ways that require discretion and legal
knowledge.269 Writing self-help books or drafting do-it-yourself legal kits is not

(1999), Paul D. Healey, Pro Se Users, Reference Liability, and the Unauthorized
Practice of Law: Twenty-Five Selected Readings, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 133 (2002), and

Rhode, supra note 76.
267. See Rhode, supra note 76, at 45-46.
268. See Bertelli, supra note 266, at 57; Rhode, supra note 76, at 81-83.
269. See, e.g., Colo. Bar Ass'n v. Miles, 557 P.2d 1202, 1203 (Colo. 1976)
(enjoining "do-it-yourself' divorce businesses from services beyond those performed by
scrivener or public stenographer, including preparation of pleadings, confidential
consultations or appointments, and advising that obtaining a marriage dissolution can
usually be done without a lawyer); Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Patton, 683 A.2d
1359, 1360 (Conn. 1996) (enjoining "Doc U Prep" service that completed forms for
uncontested legal actions); Grievance Comm. of Bar v. Dacey, 222 A.2d 339, 346-47
(Conn. 1966) (estate planning advice by non-lawyer broker could be held to be
unauthorized practice, including supplying a will and trust, filling in the blanks,
supervising execution, advising as to tax consequences); Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So.
2d 1186, 1193-94 (Fla. 1978) (distinguishing secretarial services and assistance in filling
in forms); In re First Escrow, Inc., 840 S.W.2d 839,848-49 (Mo. 1992) (escrow company
may complete forms if no judgment or discretion, but may not draft or select legal
documents or give advice concerning the effect of the document); In re Thompson, 574
S.W.2d 365, 369 (Mo. 1978) (sale of divorce kits was not unauthorized practice in the
absence of personal advice); State v Winder, 348 N.Y.S.2d 270, 272 (N.Y. App. Div.
1973) (giving advice on individuals' specific legal problems in connection with sale of
divorce kit was unauthorized practice); Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Martin, 642 N.E.2d 75,
78 (Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on the Unauthorized Practice of Law 1994) (estate planning
and trust service could not advise clients as to specific trust agreements or prepare and
draft trust agreements). See generally Catherine J. Lanctot, Scriveners in Cyberspace:
Online Document Preparationand the UnauthorizedPracticeof Law, 30 HOFSTRA L.

REv. 811 (2002) (discussing application of unauthorized practice laws to on-line services
that provide blank forms with instructions enabling consumers to prepare documents or
complete forms based on information consumers provide); State Bar of Texas, Task
Force Recommendation of a New Statutory Definitionfor the UnauthorizedPracticeof
Law, 64 TEX. B.J. 860, 862 (2001) (recommending relaxation of regulation "where the
legal service being provided can be readily determined to be of a simple nature and/or
where others have skills, training, and ethical standards which provide adequate
assurance of protection to the public"). A current example of a franchise form
preparation service is "We the People," which prepares documents on "bankruptcy,
divorce, incorporation, living trusts, wills and probate, guardianship, paternity, adoption,
restraining orders, small claims, copyright and trademark, and quit claim deeds," and
advertises "No Lawyers! Save Money!" See Judge Denies Motions to Dismiss UPL
Case Brought by State Bar, ILL. ST. BAR ASS'N BAR NEWS, May 15, 2003 (discussing
county court's denial of motion to dismiss consumer fraud complaint brought by the
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unauthorized practice of law if it does not involve individualized assistance, 2 0
while legal computer software and Internet services may cross the line into
unauthorized practice. 27 '
The mechanistic definitions of law practice based on complexity or custom
let self-interested bar committees foreclose competition by non-lawyers without
regard to whether these practitioners can render the same quality service as
lawyers, or whether clients or customers can accurately evaluate the service they
are getting from the non-lawyer. 2 Even courts that take such public policy
factors into account do not require any tangible evidence of harm to the public
or consider whether regulatory goals could be met by less restrictive means.273
The arguments against state licensing of lawyers based on traditional
theories of screening unqualified lawyers274 are even stronger in the borderline
unauthorized practice cases. Requiring broad-based legal training in three years
of law school and an intensive bar exam makes less sense as the practitioner's

Illinois State Bar Association against "We the People" for engaging in unauthorized
practice).
270. See, e.g., N.Y. Lawyers' Ass'n v. Dacey, 234 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1967)
(reversing unauthorized practice judgment against non-lawyer based on text and forms
in book entitled "How To Avoid Probate!"); Winder, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 272 (distinguishing
do-it-yourself kits for divorce and personal assistance in using the kits).
271. See supra Part I.E.2. For an important recent case on computerized legal
advice, see Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., No. CIV. A
3:97-CV-2859-H, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 813 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999), vacatedby 179
F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999). The district court held that the CD-ROM "Quicken Family
Lawyer," which enabled consumers to prepare their own wills or other simple legal
documents by using the forms and instructions provided, violated the Texas unauthorized
practice law because it "purports to select" the appropriate legal document, "customizes
the documents," and "creates an air of reliability about the documents." Id. at * 18. In
response, the Texas legislature amended the law to provide "that 'the "practice of law"
does not include the design, creation, publication, distribution, display, or sale... [of]
computer software, or similar products if the products clearly and conspicuously state that
the products are not a substitute for the advice of an attorney."' Unauthorized Practice
of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 956, 956 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting 1999
Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 799). Following enactment, the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded.
For discussions of Parsons and related law, see William H. Brown, Comment, Legal
Software andthe UnauthorizedPracticeofLaw: Protection or Protectionism,36 CAL.
W. L. REv. 157 (1999), Steve French, Note and Comment, When Public Policies Collide
...Legal "Self-Help" Software and the UnauthorizedPractice of Law,27 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 93 (2001), and Marie A. Vida, Comment, Legality of WillCreating Software: Is the Sale of Computer Software to Assist in Drafting Will
Documents Considered the UnauthorizedPracticeof Law?, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
231 (2000).
272. See Rhode, supra note 76, at 85.
273. See id. at 85-86.
274. See supra Part I.
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activities become narrower and more routine. Conversely, eliminating state
licensing of lawyers as to such matters would facilitate the entry of national firms
that routinize low-end practice without sacrificing quality.27 To be sure, buyers
of these low-end services may need more legal protection from unqualified
lawyers than corporate clients with in-house lawyers who deal with the most
reputable large law firms. But this protection is better provided by regulation or
licensing for specific kinds of activities, such as real estate conveyances,276
consumer bankruptcies2 77 or no-fault divorces, than by requiring consumers to
hire full-fledged lawyers even for marginal legal services.
Moreover, lawyer licensing has a greater effect on availability of legal
services for low-income people or those involved in smaller transactions.
Forcing these economically marginal clients to buy Cadillacs when they only
need Chevrolets may cause them to rely on self-help, and thereby reduce the
quality of services these clients actually receive.27
The impact has been
ameliorated somewhat by exempting legal assistance for the poor from
unauthorized practice laws.2 79 But since these exemptions leave the least
sophisticated and therefore most vulnerable clients exposed to supposedly
unqualified practitioners, they suggest that lawyer licensing is more concerned
with protecting lawyers' profits than with protecting the public.
The analysis of unauthorized practice changes if the rationale for lawyer
licensing is participation in lawmaking rather than ensuring quality of legal
services. Under the lawmaking-incentive rationale, no license should be required
for areas of practice where jurisdictional competition exerts little or no pressure
toward efficient laws, including divorce, real estate conveyances and tort

275. See McChesney & Muris, supranote 23.
276. See Palomar, supra note 47, at 528 (discussing real estate conveyance
specialist as a lower-cost alternative to lawyers).
277. There is special regulation und c:
S.C. Section 110 for preparers of
bankruptcy petitions that requires the preparers to disclose certain information and
provides for damages for preparer negligence or fraud. See In re Boettcher, 262 B.R. 94,
96 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2001) ("We the People" franchisee engaged in practice of law by
filling in blanks in form drafted by attorney with I1 U.S.C. Section 110 regulating
preparers of bankruptcy petitions); Russell A. Brown, Bankruptcy andthe Unauthorized
Practiceof Law, 35 ARIZ. ATTY 30 (Feb. 1999) (discussing I1 U.S.C. § 110 (1994)).
However, this provision does not authorize practice of law in violation of state statutes,
and therefore does not replace lawyer licensing. See I1 U.S.C. § 110(k) (2000).
278. See supra text accompanying note 64.
279. See generally Bertelli, supra note 266, at 15. For cases applying such
exceptions, see Dixon v. Ga. Indigent Legal Servs., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1156, 1165-66
(S.D. Ga. 1975), In re N.H. Disabilities Rights Ctr., Inc., 541 A.2d 208,209 (N.H. 1988),
In re Education Law Center, Inc., 429 A.2d 1051, 1058 (N.J. 1981), Azzarello v. Legal
Aid Soc'y, 185 N.E.2d 566, 570 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962), and Wayne Moore, Are
Organizationsthat ProvideFreeLegal Services Engagedin the UnauthorizedPractice
of Law?, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2397 (1999).
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litigation. 8 ° State competition depends on the parties' ability to contract for the
applicable law in advance of a dispute, 81 or on whether enforceability of
contractual choice of law depends on contracting parties' contacts with the
designated state, such as the location of real estate. 2 Without efficiencyenhancing state competition, lawyers may push for inefficient law, or simply
benefit from the cartel effect of excluding non-legal practitioners without any
side law-creation benefits. Moreover, removing the lawyer monopoly would
have the law-creation benefit of encouraging the entry oflegal service businesses
that could lobby against competition-reducing regulation.
The law-creation argument may play a useful marginal role in unauthorized
practice cases. The argument meshes with the quality-screening rationale in
many typical unauthorized practice cases such as those involving real estate or
divorce work. Where there is little quality-screening basis for licensing, the lack
of efficient state competition, and therefore of a lawmaking-incentive rationale,
should confirm the inapplicability of licensing laws. On the other hand, both
arguments justify licensing transactional work. Licensing is arguably more
important for quality screening in relatively low-end transactional work, such as
routine corporation-formation, than in high-end work by reputable law firms for
sophisticated clients. But as long as states efficiently compete, licensing might
make sense even in low-end transactional cases that involve only minimal skill.
Lawyers may gain some of the additional law business that would be generated
by streamlining practice in these areas. Moreover, given jurisdictional
competition, lawyers who attempt to raise costs for consumers stand to lose
business to lawyers, or non-lawyers, in other jurisdictions.
In some practice areas the two rationales for licensing might lead to
different results. For example, there is no law-creationjustification for licensing
tort lawyers because of the inefficiency of state competition in this area. But
irrespective of the law-creation benefits of state licensing, states have strong
incentives to retain the power to regulate lawyers' courtroom activities.283

280. See supra Part III.B.3.
281. It follows that changing the choice of law rule to permit such contracts could
affect the analysis of lawyer licensing. For a defense of contractual choice regarding
divorce law, see Buckley & Ribstein, supranote 5.

282. See supra text accompanying notes 170-74. Note that there may be a tension
regarding the contacts rule between the efficiency of contractual choice and encouraging
lawyer participation in lawmaking. See supra note 174.

283. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
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C. Licensing Specialists
The law-creation argument might justify licensing some legal specialties but
not others. For example, separately licensing specialties such as intellectual
property, bankruptcy, securities or tax would give lawyers in those areas extra
incentives to participate in law reform by increasing their ability to capture the
benefits of the reform.284 To be sure, even without such licensing, lawyers can
coordinate lawmaking efforts through voluntary specialty bar associations. But
these associations do not provide entry restrictions comparable to those provided
by unauthorized practice laws and therefore may not effectively prevent freeriding on the group's lawmaking efforts. Although there is some federal
licensing of specialties,285 state specialty licensing would have the added benefit
of enabling both general state legal competition and state variations as to
licensing requirements.
D. State Variations
This Article's theory of state licensing does not necessarilyjustify licensing,
or the same approach to licensing, in all states. As long as firms and parties are
mobile or can contract for the law of any state, state law efficiency requires only
that some states compete to provide efficient law. It follows that only some
states need to provide incentives to produce efficient law, including lawyer
licensing. Other states may decide that the perverse effects of licensing on the
price and availability of legal services outweigh the benefits, particularly where
incentives to participate in lawmaking are relatively unimportant. The potential
for this sort of variation is another advantage of a state-based rather than federal
system of licensing. By contrast, a client-protection theory of lawyer licensing
implies that clients in all states need to be protected, and therefore that all states
should license. This argument provides a stronger rationale for federal licensing.
E. Other Professions
This Article's analysis applies only to lawyer licensing and not to licensing
of other professions. Lawyers raise special considerations because of their
interest in the overall quality of state law. Moreover, this rationale for state
licensing may matter more to law than other professions such as medicine

284. Licensing also might encourage lawyers to develop specialized knowledge in
order to better serve clients where lawyers otherwise might not capture sufficient benefits
to produce a socially optimal amount of expertise. This rationale for licensing is related
to the property rights theory in this Article but differs in that it focuses on the benefit to
the lawyers' clients rather than to development of state law.
285. See supra text accompanying note 94.
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because of the interstate nature of law practice. Given this interstate nature,
requiring lawyers to be licensed in the law of a particular state may generate
more costs than analogous requirements for other professions,286 and therefore
may require a stronger rationale than the standard asymmetric information theory
that applies to professional licensing generally. By contrast, doctors usually see
patients in the hospital or office where they are based, although as with law this
may change with the development of Intemet-based delivery of professional
advice.
This Article's analysis may, however, relate indirectly to other professions.
Just as licensing lawyers may give lawyers an incentive to maintain the law,
licensing doctors and accountants may give those professionals incentives to
maintain their chosen fields. For example, accountants have incentives to
promulgate and maintain accounting standards, and doctors may have incentives
to standardize medical procedures, at least in part because of the monopoly rights
conferred by professional licensing.287 A possible difference between lawyers
and these other groups is that there is more need for uniform standards regarding
activities of professionals outside law than there is for state laws. The particular
value of lawyer licensing in promoting jurisdictional competition therefore may
not apply to other professions.
V. CAVEATS AND CONCLUSIONS

The increasingly national scope of the legal profession, new methods of
delivering legal services, and doubts about the adequacy of state regulation in the
wake of recent corporate frauds, strain already dubious existing rationales for
state licensing of lawyers based on ensuring lawyer quality. But before
abandoning this system, lawmakers should consider this Article's alternative
rationale for state licensing-that it encourages lawyers' participation in state
lawmaking. Eliminating or federalizing lawyer licensing might increase freeriding off of lawyers' lawmaking efforts, thereby reducing their incentives to
engage in these efforts. This, in turn, could adversely affect the quality of state
law.
This rationale for state licensing of lawyers is, to be sure, fragile at best.
First, licensing has only a marginal effect on lawyers' incentives to participate
in lawmaking because it gives lawyers only an incomplete property right in the
law of the state where they are licensed. Each lawyer must share benefits of
lawmaking efforts with lawyers from her own state and, to some extent, from
other states. Indeed, lawyer licensing may actually reduce lawyers' participation
in state lawmaking. If state-based licensing did not tie lawyers to particular

286. See supra Part I.D.
287. There may also be direct intellectual property protection in this situation. See
supra note 177.
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states, legal talent would be free to flow to its highest and best use. For example,
without a licensing requirement, an expert corporate lawyer living and practicing
in Pennsylvania would have more incentive to devote resources to developing an
expertise in Delaware, federal or uniform law, and to protect the value of that
expertise by investing in the creation and maintenance of those laws.2"" The
effects of lawyer licensing in encouraging investments in home-state law
therefore must be balanced against the effects of discouraging out-of-state
investments.
Second, even if lawyer licensing does encourage lawyers to participate in
lawmaking, this does not necessarily make state law more efficient than it would
be without licensing. Lawyers have incentives to make law more lawyerfriendly, and thus to reduce the efficiency of state law.2" 9 At least as to some
types of laws, state competition may not adequately constrain these incentives.
Thus, the costs of giving lawyers a monopoly over legal services may outweigh
any benefits of encouraging them to participate in lawmaking.
Third, the lawmaking incentive rationale may be attacked on fairness
grounds. Low-income clients arguably bear the costs of lawyer licensing
disproportionately to any benefits they receive from lawyers' participation in
improving business and commercial laws. 2
Fourth, licensing's benefits of encouraging lawyer participation in state
lawmaking will be difficult to establish empirically. An empirical test would
require correlating myriad factors, including type of practice, general background
of jurisdictional competition and types of legal rules, 29' with necessarily
imprecise evaluations of the efficiency of state law. There may be no reliable
way to determine what state law would look like under a different approach to
lawyer licensing.
Despite these caveats, the relationship between state licensing of lawyers
and state law efficiency is sufficiently plausible that it should be considered
along with other potential effects of lawyer licensing. First, lawyers clearly do
actively participate in state lawmaking other than for clients, and would have less
reason to do so if they had no special interest in the law of a particular state,
other things being equal.
Second, any lawyer participation in state lawmaking is especially significant
at a time when the increasing complexity and scope of regulation place greater
burdens on state lawmakers, who operate with tiny budgets and often on a parttime basis. Without lawyers' assistance, the states may have to cede even more
policymaking to the federal government, weakening further the laboratory of
state law.

288. I am indebted to Jonathan Klick for this point.
289. See supra Part III.B.2.
290. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
291. See Part III.B.3-4.
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Third, even if lawyers' influence is not always positive, it is necessary to
compare the current political dynamic with the situation that would exist in the
absence of lawyer licensing. Eliminating lawyer licensing may shift power to
non-lawyer, or trial lawyer, interest groups who seek wealth transfers and who
lack transactional lawyers' stake in the efficiency of a state's overall legal
system.
Fourth, even if the net benefits of the lawmaking-incentive rationale are
unclear, the same is true of the existing lawyer-quality rationale. The
lawmaking-incentive theory therefore may have an important marginal role in the
overall policy analysis of lawyer licensing.
It follows that the best approach to reform of state licensing may be to tinker
with the current system rather than eliminate it. For example, the states might
allow more jurisdictional choice ofethical rules,292 or deregulate areas of practice
where licensing serves little purpose under either rationale.293 But before
eliminating or federalizing lawyer licensing, lawmakers should consider that,
while more competition in providing legal services may be a good thing, this
competition may come at the expense of lower quality state laws or a weakened
federal system.

292. See Ribstein, supra note 72 (suggesting giving law firms some power to
choose among state ethical rules that affect law firm structure).
293. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the scope of lawyer licensing under the
lawmaking-incentive rationale).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/1

66

